

Terrorism Revisited

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I had prepared a very academic presentation, but it's 1:00 in the afternoon. I have learned from my classes at the University of Kansas that I might put you to sleep if I read it or deliver a PowerPoint presentation; thus, I will refrain from doing so. Yet, I also know that you love to hear a German accent and so I shall simply ruminate for a while about: What is terrorism? Where is it occurring? What might we do about it?

I was shaken back into reality recently when, at the University of Kansas, Viet Dinh, one of the authors of the Patriot Act, who was at the time an Assistant Attorney General to John Ashcroft, described in some detail how he negotiated US Senate and House versions of a bill titled: "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism," which eventually became known as the Patriot Act. I heard a law professor, in the presence of the current dean as well as a former dean of the Law School, earnestly discuss why José Padilla should not have been arrested at O'Hare International Airport. The legal discussion went something as follows: Since O'Hare International Airport was clearly not a battlefield, you couldn't possibly simply arrest José Padilla and charge him, or label him, an unlawful combatant even though he was returning from Pakistan, was on a terrorist watch list, and was suspected to be involved in a conspiracy to explode a "dirty bomb" somewhere in the United States. For me, this underscores how divided America has become, and how the American academy has failed to engage in the "real world" where violence and terrorism are an everyday fact of life. I was taken aback because shortly thereafter, a Turkish professor of law took the stage and made his presentation with a strong plea that the international community should reach some greater agreement focusing on the very real terrorist challenges now existing in at least 70 out of today's nearly 190 national states, rather than dwelling on philosophical constructs about what constitutes actionable acts of terrorism. Existing differences of opinion are based on assuming that, on the one hand, all terrorism is simply criminal activity and therefore should be handled by local police forces and the existing criminal justice system even without the additional provisions of the Patriot Act; whereas on the other hand there are those, including myself, who would argue we are at war and therefore these conventional, traditional, criminal justice statutes and the law professors teaching them, are, in fact, becoming inoperative and dysfunctional. I leave it up to you to make your own choice.

Furthermore, the point I'm trying to make is that, if I take the University of Kansas as a microcosm of our social universe today, I find it quite remarkable that

only one percent of the American population currently serves in the military—one percent. In other words, the military presents a very miniscule part of American society despite that, if you look at television—the news—one might well conclude that the US military is more omnipotent in our society than in fact it is. Obviously, since the United States is at war our military is a very important segment of our society; nevertheless, it still represents only one percent of our total population. A Harvard professor recently published the results of a study deducing that three-fourths of high-school-age Americans would not serve in any military, even though they would be called upon to do so. I must add that sometimes, when I hear all the historians going back to what happened in the 200 years plus of US history, I'm reminded, as a German-born American and immigrant to this country who has served in the military and taught at a War College, that I'm not against the reading of Thucydides, and/or Sun Tzu, or the study of accounts of the Pelopponesian Wars, or the lessons learned from military occupations of Haiti or Panama. But I would also like to remind this audience that we should pay much greater attention to what is happening right now and what may happen in the immediate future. War has always brought many unforeseen consequences that may, or may not be repeated. Certainly we must learn from the past, and our past mistakes—our past failures. Equally important, however, is that we should focus more viably, more consistently, more accurately, on future challenges, future theaters of war, and the cultural settings of any potential foes.

In a way, I agree with one of my learned military experts that at present, various people are shooting at us Americans simply because we are Americans. Even greater numbers of individuals around the world dislike us, or worse, hate us. We might well have to learn more expeditiously whom to kill and whom to spare. We will have to reconsider the nature and meaning of terrorism, and we have to do so with a different mind-set and through different eyes than we did a few short years ago.

In 1972, two colleagues and I started a course titled “Violence and Terrorism in the Modern World” at the University of Kansas. When this course came up for consideration by the university’s Committee on Undergraduate Studies charged with approving additions to the curriculum, our colleagues politely informed us, in very direct language, to “drop dead.” Terrorism was not an academic subject, it was not worthy of any academic attention, and perhaps we had better desist from teaching about such an unpleasant topic with no real applicability or value to a college curriculum. We prevailed, nevertheless, and we have been teaching this course for more than 30 years. Needless to say, we haven’t changed our mind. So let me talk briefly about what I feel, as a non-native-born American, about the word terrorism and how I, currently, perceive this concept.

At times, recently, I have even suggested that we should bid farewell to the

whole concept of a “war on terrorism.” We have waged a “war on poverty;” we had, and still are engaged in, a “war on drugs;” we fought and are still fighting a “war on AIDS;” we even have a kind of war on gay marriage and evolution—at least in some parts of Kansas. But I wonder not just “What’s The Matter with Kansas?” but to where all this is leading us? What is happening in all these still continuing “wars?” When I try to connect with my students of today, I find that they are generally unaffected by what is taking place in the world. For many of them, if not for most, it is more important to attend a basketball or football game with tens of thousands of other spectators—and I do understand all the accouterments that make this form of entertainment so attractive. Who among all of these sports fans would rather meet with a very small group to discuss what is happening in far off lands? Why concern yourself with such unpleasant realities as violence, death, terrorism, or war? Thus, it is probably not unreasonable to conclude that a majority of Americans today apparently are largely disinterested in foreign events. Why should this be? It is a fact that the concept of terrorism has been used in every which way. You have all heard that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter;” that seems to be a widely held opinion among Americans, even among some intellectuals. This means then that the term may have lost its effectiveness because it is so often misused, or at best, inappropriately used.

I came to the United States in late 1948 from Germany as a student, and shortly thereafter, in mid 1950, found myself in the American military in another war—Korea. Since then, 25 June 1950, the beginning of the Korean War, the United States has never really been at peace. There was always either more war or less war, but never, no war. Nobody can viably argue that this has been a very peaceful 50 or so years. An armistice was signed in Korea in July 1953, and open warfare at Dien Bin Phu began that November when North Vietnamese insurgents (at the time) challenged a regular French force. The war had simply shifted its geographical arena. Therefore, to recognize the usefulness or disusefulness of the term “terrorism,” we, the American people, must decide if we are at war or not. And this is not just another war. This is not just another war like Korea or Vietnam. This is a real, very expensive, very critical, very different war that is going to be with us for at least 25 to 30 years. Therefore, might I suggest that the military, just like universities, have done a less than adequate job of engaging the American public or informing it sufficiently about what is really taking place in the world, and then persuading it to become far more engaged.

I took note of a remark about the former Iranian Prime Minister, Mossadegh and the Shah of Iran, yet, I am also painfully aware that, if I ask my students about what happened tot this former Prime Minister or the late Shah, I get nothing but blank stares. What I have referenced is that all of us Americans must realize that we are, unfortunate as this may be, involved in a prolonged armed conflict. We are,

whether we want to be or not, more internationally challenged and engaged than ever before, and, thus, for our survival, in our self-interest, we can ill afford to do business as usual. Fiddling while Rome is burning is not really an option. This entails then, that we better think very carefully about how we are going to train people in cultural awareness and also educate them for a reality that must include terrorism, war, insurgency AND counterinsurgency.

I have thought about these issues since the 1960s. I worked, at one time in my career, for the special operations office (of the American University) helping to write country handbooks, and manuals for CRACs in the Republic of Korea (Korean-US Forces Community Relations Councils). I assisted with writing books on insurgencies from Algeria to Vietnam and Korea to the Japanese in Manchuria in 1931. Isn't it then puzzling that we don't have a better mechanism created to connect all Americans—or at least all Americans enrolled in our schools—more appropriately, more efficiently, with what is happening in the world. A local Kansas newspaper, the *Lawrence Journal World*, noted in a recent article that the United States is even falling behind in producing high school graduates. We are now between eighth and tenth in an overall international ranking. We are falling behind countries like South Korea and Singapore. In other words, more of our young men and women today do not even opt to finish high school. How then can we meaningfully confront such complex topics as a Sunni-driven insurgency in Iraq, or a nuclear-bomb technology progression in North Korea or Iran? How can we possibly hope to respond to these challenges without educating our American public on these and other critical issues? This holds true for our military, our universities, and our high schools. I happen to think that one can't easily learn a foreign language at age 25 or 30. For many critical languages such as Chinese, Korean, Arabic, or Uighur you have to start no later than high school. Therefore, we should think very seriously about how to produce, through ROTC, or a program like ROTC, a whole new, differently educated/trained generation of intelligence analysts and military foreign area officers (FAOs) from the ground up.

Consider the term “terrorism” for a moment. Contemplate the fact that we haven't come up with a better, far more descriptive term reflecting violent, deadly realities existing in the early 21st century. Primarily, we overuse the term “terrorism” because people have come to accept it. Terrorism contains the one dictum that makes terrorism terroristic, and that is fear. Presently, many students have not encountered that fear since they have not personally experienced any acts of terrorism. They do not fear that in Lawrence, Kansas they suddenly can't drink water from the tap, or they can't get their pizza in the student union. They are not really worried about their everyday existence. They are, however, concerned that the University of Kansas football team will not have a good season, or that their team loses a game in the NCAA finals. Thus, are we justified in asking what kind of

message we are conveying to the American public? Why do we want them to know what is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, or mainland China? Does it really matter if the Peoples' Republic of China threatens to attack Taiwan or the mistress of Kim Chong Il in North Korea dies?

When should we properly use the concept of terrorism? When might we properly use the concept of insurgency? We have experienced insurgencies in a great many of the wars we have fought over the last two centuries; yet, we seem to rediscover every time we are in trouble and/or at war, that there is an ongoing insurgency somewhere where American soldiers are fighting and dying because of the insurgency. When are we going to wake up to the fact that not only do we need historians to tell us what happened in the past, but, perhaps even more so, we need knowledgeable individuals who will tell us what is happening right now, and perhaps, in the future? In my own discipline, anthropology, we need a more reality-based anthropology with research and fieldwork perhaps under fire, in "critical" geographical settings where the American military is, or will be, actively engaged.

Someone noted that we should learn whom to kill and whom NOT to kill. Considerable cultural sensitivity is required to distinguish the sandals and the *dosh-dosha*, or the turban, or any other distinctive article of clothing and their particular colors and shapes, in a variety of different cultural settings, to decide very quickly about friend or foe—within a second—otherwise, you may be dead. Anthropologists have been teaching cultural sensitivity for well over 50 years. I urge you to open up your curriculum on insurgency and on what some military term "terrorism," to the best, brightest and most culturally sensitive brains we have available. Definitely include and involve more individuals that are non-native-born Americans who know languages, have lived over long periods of time abroad, know other cultures, and look at Americans very much in the same way that most of you, a military audience, are looking at Iraqis.

I recall that when I arrived in the United States as a student at Ohio State, I was asked to write an essay on the topic of what democracy meant to me. It didn't mean much since I had received a good part of my earlier education in Nazi Germany, and obviously democracy was not something I heard, or learned about, everyday. You have to be aware that non-material culture—the ideas, the values, and attitudes—are learned and not inherited. Anthropologists maintain that, yes, the 46 chromosomes inherited from a father and mother compose one's genetic make-up that at least up to now, cannot be changed. Culture, however, is learned whereas our genes are inherited. Unless I am well over six feet, I most likely couldn't ever become a University of Kansas basketball player—even if I were the right age. One is not born an American, rather, one becomes an American by being acculturated into the American culture through parental and educational socialization. One is not born as

a colonel or major at Fort Leavenworth nor with all the skills and accomplishments one needs to make it to Bell Hall. You learned all these things in grade school, in high school, in college, and in your individual military service. It follows then, that we would do well to place a different emphasis on what our young learn in our schools; and we would be well advised to change some American attitudes on public education. Money alone will not be sufficient.

I was once involved in the negotiations of a compact with the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. I was fortunate in that I was flown across the Pacific approaching 100 times, and I experienced living in spectacular island worlds like Palau and Yap in the western Carolines and Saipan in the eastern Marianas. However, if I question my students on the most recent territorial acquisition of the United States no one is able to offer a comment. The American-affiliated, unincorporated territory of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands remains ignored and unrecognized by most current American college students. Furthermore, when questioned about possible US overseas territories for anthropological fieldwork, no one readily names Yap or American Samoa. Moreover, if one were to continue and ask, for example: "What happened on the island of Tinian back in World War II?" not a single student recalls an airstrip and a certain B-29 taking off from there on a historical flight that will probably be known a thousand years hence. "Have you ever heard of the Enola Gay?" No. "Atomic bombs?" "Well, did we drop one on Germany or one on Hiroshima in Japan?" These young men and women are the future leaders, the senators and congressmen, the college professors, the instructors and students of the Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff College. With that kind of reality, can one really ask about terrorism in Fallujah, Iraq or in Afghanistan?

We do need to look at history, past realities, and lessons learned, but just as much we need to pay more attention to the present. At the same time, we need to more effectively forecast the future. What do we know about North Korea? Why do we teach a Korean language at the National Defense Language Institute in Monterey that is not easily understood by North Koreans? What do we really know about Kim Jong Il and his father Kim Il Sung, North Koreans, their culture, and their ways of learned behavior like *chulima* or the spirit of North Korean self-reliance? What do we know about Iran, Iranians, and their culture, and how many Farsi speakers are we training, not to say anything about the current, and surely accelerating, challenge to the United States by the Peoples' Republic of China? Let me remind you that in the lifetime of my students, Iraq will have a population of roughly 50 million people. Iran will have a population of 97 million, and Afghanistan will have a population of around 80 million. If we can't deal well with insurgencies now, how in the world are we going to deal with double the numbers of individuals in those countries that are dissatisfied with their own culture and

with their own system of government. Georgie Anne Geyer observed in 1996, that the Middle East:

Is a region in economic and social crisis. It is one of the few regions of the world to have experienced a long-term decline in real per capita income. That decline is twice as great as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. It is also the only region of the world to have experienced a long period of declining productivity. The Middle East is in the throes of a major demographic crisis. The population doubles every 26 to 29 years in the region compared to every 42 years for the world as a whole and to 162 years for advanced, developed nations. This creates an extremely young population with 43 percent to 45 percent 14 years or younger, versus 31.6 percent for the world and 22 percent for developed countries... Many young men in the Middle East have never had a job that really contributes to their nation's productivity and have no hope of getting one.

Did anyone seriously note these and/or similar observations? Be aware that all I am trying to bring before you are existing reasons for terrorism in different geographical and cultural settings. I wish I could give you a more sexy definition for this phenomenon, but “asymmetric warfare” has not, to date, replaced “terrorism.” Nevertheless, what is incontestable in all of this is that terrorism occurs in more than 70 out of 190 countries. How are we reacting to the reality that the United States, as the only remaining superpower, is being challenged by asymmetric states like North Korea and Iran, or by organizations like al Qaeda?

Let me remind all of you about the percentage of populations under 25 years-of-age in the various Arab Muslim countries of the Middle East. The population pyramid in the whole Muslim-Arab world remains noticeably skewed. In Oman, 63 percent of the population is under 25; in Egypt, it's 56 percent. If you look at Iran it is 59 percent; for Iraq it is 52 percent. These are considerable population segments under 25. If you know anything about what is happening in the worlds of insurgencies and terrorism it is that we are facing young males with their testosterone bubbling. They do all the things that our young men and women do at the University of Kansas, but there are also some important differences because these particular young men have weapons, they are not distracted by basketball championship games or dates with willing young co-eds, they play for keeps with highly lethal weapons—not just violent video games for them. This is a reality problem, and a challenge that I have heard discussed very rarely. The population forecasts for all of these Muslim, as well as of the other developing countries, indicate that their respective populations under 25 are expanding rapidly and therefore the problem

is not going to go away but will very likely increase. Military force alone is not an answer. You may recall that the first US governor general of the Philippines requested not only additional troops, but also American schoolteachers and that these school teachers created a system of education in the Philippines using English as a second language. To this very day Filipinos benefit from an American-like educational system.

All of you, of course, know German because you speak to God everyday. You might understand from this graphic representation that most of the Muslims in Germany are Turks—whereas the Muslims in France are primarily of North African origin. Furthermore, Muslims in Germany, rather than becoming acculturated in the greater secular German culture are becoming more religious not less religious. In other words, the material culture of television, computers, music, CDs, DVDs and many such other culture-technology accouterments are affecting them in a different way, so that the onslaught of globalization that they believe is led by the United States renders them more religious, not more secular as might be expected. And these are the Turks living in that ocean of German culture.

I'm not so sure if it is fair to call Professor Bernard Lewis the godfather of the neoconservatives because he argues that much of our problem with Muslims and the insurgency fought by them is caused by an Islamic culture that is one of poverty, one of unresolved internal tensions, one of having governments that are despotic and are not democratic, etcetera. Professor Lewis maintains that Islamic culture today is failing its populations and that stark reality will render *jihadists* more determined to fight us than ever.

Take the example of Iraq. Is this progress? This is not Vietnam. This is not World War II. Iraq, with a different culture and thus different value system, is not like Germany or Japan in 1945. Forget it. It's a totally different cultural context. Without knowing a great deal about a specific culture—of the Turkmen, the Kurds, the Shia, the Sunni, and the tribal populations living in the marshes of southern Iraq—one can hardly decide what dangers lay ahead. We learn from the statistics that the most dangerous ordinance are mortar rockets in Baghdad. Why should that be? Because it is a sophisticated population that has available weapons to chose from. That is similar to your significant other giving you a Harley-Davidson, you will surely not just keep it in the garage. You're going to ride it. The Middle East is awash in weapons and these young men with few, if any, career or employment opportunities are going to use them.

When you consider the Sunni Triangle, statistics show where the attacks are actually occurring. These are the deaths that obviously indicate what this violence is all about. The 21 to 25 year-olds are the most numerous of American fatalities

in Iraq. These are young American men, and increasingly also young women, who are the same age as students at the University of Kansas but they find themselves in Iraq or Afghanistan, and they know relatively little about what they're getting into because we, as educators, have failed them. We must teach about these albeit grim realities and different cultures, not just at Fort Leavenworth, but also in our high schools, in our colleges, our universities across our land.

The definition of terrorism has to be re-evaluated because this is a new kind of war; one that we are not used to and have yet much to learn about. Fort Leavenworth as an institution is every bit as cumbersome as is the University of Kansas. It takes imagination, drive, and probably the ear of the Commanding General to bring about change and something new and different. However, if it is too different, it will be resisted by some, because change is ever unsettling. Nevertheless, let's remember that too little change over a long period of time is as dysfunctional as too much change in a very short period of time. If significant segments of American society continue to deny or ignore that we are at war, and continue to do business as usual, we are bound to pay a very heavy price.

I have taken more than my time. I thank you for listening to an anthropologist—not a Kumbaya-singing FAO—someone who continues to try his best to bring about change by better understanding the plethora of cultural paradigms that might well save a few American lives.

The US Military and the Global Counterinsurgency

Robert M. Cassidy

This is a guerrilla war. Not one waged within a state, but one waged across states. Each guerrilla action is designed to elicit an overreaction that will, in turn, increase the guerrilla's support within Islam. The aggressor has a discernible organization. It has forces organized into combat formations, dispersed individuals with varying degrees of training, field commanders, and senior leadership. Waging Ancient War¹

The guerrilla is paramount. Like a swarm of irate hornets surrounding an unprotected man, the guerrillas dart in, deliver a stinging attack, and retreat quickly when a powerful hand is raised against them. Viet Cong²

The above quotes are discerning and somewhat disquieting because the United States' enemies in the ongoing global war, particularly those affiliated with or allied with "the base" (al Qaeda), are fighting a guerrilla war of global scale and scope in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and potentially in Thailand. Employing terror to attack America and its coalition partners overseas and at home, employing any means, their goal is to disrupt the coalition and to threaten its members' democracies by employing terror and insurgent tactics to prolong the war and to wear down the West's will to persist in the struggle. However, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is a misnomer and is not at all useful in describing and circumscribing our enemy and the kind of war we are prosecuting. The war against al Qaeda, its associate groups, and other groups that rally behind the ideological banner of radical Islamic fundamentalism is better viewed as a global counterinsurgency in which the United States and its coalition partners endeavor to isolate and eradicate an overlapping network of nasty nihilists who seek sanctuary, support, and recruits in the ungoverned periphery and seam states inhabited by the humiliated have-nots.

The terrorists and global guerrillas of the 21st century are incubating in Asia, Africa, and South America. They also form amid the populations of the West as alienated expatriates galvanize in and around mosques where they become proselytes to a radicalized version of Islam, preached by mullahs linked to al Qaeda-affiliated groups. Victory and death is an apt mantra for the suicide bomber or insurgent who believes in a blissful paradise in the afterlife. Notwithstanding the mutating and transnational nature of this 21st-century brand of guerrilla war, many of the techniques and tactics of the guerrilla remain unchanged and even similar to those employed by one of the US military's most resolute historical guerrilla enemies—the Viet Cong.

The bad news is that counterinsurgency is more arduous and complex than waging war against adversaries who remain willing and sufficiently injudicious to

confront the West within its preferred conventional war paradigm—a model that has predominated in warfare for the past several centuries. Modern military history shows that the West and its military forces have generally dominated and monopolized the conventional way of war, usually winning when the east or the south decided to fight according to this paradigm. The philosophies of Jomini, Clausewitz, and Svechin are entrenched in Western military cultures. Consequently, the US military, as well as many of its Western partners, have previously exhibited an almost exclusive preference for a big, conventional war paradigm. One characteristic of this predilection for conventional war has been an espousal of the direct use of military force, combining maneuver and firepower to mass combat power at the decisive point to bring about the *destruction* or *annihilation* of some enemy force or army. Conversely, the US Army has traditionally and culturally eschewed and marginalized counterinsurgency as a fleeting aberration. Regrettably, this military cultural proclivity has hampered the Army and some other Western armies from seriously studying and learning the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. Nor has counterinsurgency been well codified in the US military's institutional memory or doctrine, even though the US military has an institutional history with examples of success in prosecuting counterinsurgency operations.

An ideologically driven global insurgency—a fourth generation-like mutating form of war characterized by a stateless, adaptive, complex, and polycephalous host—is proving to be even more challenging than traditional insurgencies. Another challenge is that the enemy we are most likely to fight for the foreseeable future is one who has for many more centuries embraced a different philosophy of war. Potential adversaries are from Asia and the Near East, cultures that generally espouse the Eastern tradition of war. The Eastern way of war stems from the philosophies of Sun Tzu and Mao and it is distinguishable from the western way by its reliance on indirectness, perfidy, attrition, and protraction. In other words, the eastern way of war is inherently more irregular, unorthodox, and asymmetric than our traditional conception of war.

According to one distinguished British historian, the history of culture's development in Asia clearly demonstrates that is a major determinant of the character of warfare. If there is such a thing as an Oriental way of war as something that is discernible and distinct as European warfare, it is characterized by behavior unique to it. Keegan asserts that delay, evasion, and indirectness are three distinguishable behavioral traits of an Eastern way of war. Furthermore, as a result of the United States' coalitions two victories against Iraq during the two principally conventional wars in the Persian Gulf, it is unlikely that another second-tier power will be dumb enough to fight the US and its allies according to this Western warfare paradigm.³

Otto von Bismarck was once reported to have stated: “Fools say they learn

from experience; I prefer to learn from the experience of others.” The fact that a not insignificant number of American and coalition troops have been fighting to counter insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere provides a very realistic and grave impetus for the idea that learning from the experiences of other counterinsurgencies from the past is preferable to adapting in contact. Moreover, an important corollary to this is the imperative to learn from and adapt to the current counterinsurgencies, and to capture them in our institutional memory, instead of erasing these experiences because of a perception that counterinsurgency is once again a fleeting aberration. Some general American military lessons in counterinsurgency are listed in a slideshow addendum to this article. This article places the current global war against al Qaeda and others in a different context, as a protracted and complex global insurgency waged by networks and groupings of transnational insurgents and terrorists motivated by extremist religious ideology. I borrow my organization for this article from both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, by merging together two of their more well known maxims to arrive at this outline: know the enemy, know yourself, and know what kind of war you are prosecuting. The conclusion distills some current thinking about what the strategic environment requires for a successful conclusion to insurgency on a global scale. One distinct difference in the nature of this evolving insurgency is that it lacks the Maoist notion of a phased revolutionary guerrilla paradigm that culminates in the mobilization of conventional forces.⁴

The Enemy: Radical Fundamentalist Islamic Networks

When you're fighting against functional nihilists like al Qaeda who see your way of life as anathema to everything they hope and dream about in the future, you are not going to be able to deter these people.⁵

Al Qaeda is also characterized by a broad-based ideology, a novel structure, a robust capacity for regeneration and a very diverse membership that cuts across ethnic, class, and national boundaries. It is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups: it comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan; satellite terrorist cells worldwide; a conglomerate of Islamist political parties; and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities.⁶

Al Qaeda and its affiliated networks espouse an ideology that can mobilize a broad base of support while minimizing national, class, ethnic, or intra-Islamic sectarian boundaries. Furthermore, America's enemies in this global war are complex, adaptive, asymmetric, innovative, dispersed, networked, resilient, and capable of regeneration. The groups that affiliate with the al Qaeda group function as a loose coalition, each with its own command, control, and communications structures. According to an expert on al Qaeda, “the coalition has one unique characteristic that enhances its resilience and allows forces to be multiplied in pursuit of a particular

objective: whenever necessary, these groups interact or merge, cooperating ideologically, financially, and technically.” In 1998, al Qaeda reorganized into four distinct but interconnected entities to further advance the goals of radical Islam: the first was a pyramidal structure to enable better strategic and tactical direction; the second was a global network of terrorists; the third was guerrilla warfare bases inside Afghanistan; and the fourth was a loose alliance of transnational insurgent and terrorist groups. Even though al Qaeda is a political entity infused with a radical religious ideology, its operations are founded on a cultural network from which it recruits known persons; it has no formal process by which it recruits and promotes its members. The longevity and resilience of al Qaeda are not predicated on the total quantity of terrorists and insurgents that it may have trained in the past but more simply on its capacity to continue to recruit, mobilize, and inspire both actual and potential fighters, supporters, and sympathizers.⁷

Al Qaeda and like-minded Islamist fanatics are waging a global *jihad* that draws on historical roots: Muslim reactions to colonial rule; a series of military defeats at the hands of the West; a profound sense of humiliation and a desire for revenge; a host of failing governments and economies in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; an increase in emigration accompanied by the isolation and alienation frequently felt by marginalized immigrant diasporas; a vivified sense of unity among all Muslims fueled by charismatic leaders such as Osama bin Laden, who employ images of suffering Muslims—in Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, and Iraq—to animate followers; and a common sense of purpose and lasting cohesion created by the ultimately successful *jihad* against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s ultimate aim is to supplant the Westphalian secular state system with a medieval caliphate system based on an extreme interpretation of Islam. The foci in this struggle are generally located in the belt running along the north of Africa, through the Middle East, across Central Asia, to the Islamic frontiers of Indonesia and the Philippines—what has been called the arc of instability. With few exceptions, the states along this seam are failing or are poorly governed by corrupt, unpopular, or untenable regimes.⁸

Osama bin Laden “provided a suitably inspirational manifesto for a disparate mass of Muslims who saw themselves as victims and as an underclass, and his success restored their self-esteem.” He developed an extremely effective rallying cry that cut across a divided Islamic culture. This clarion call is undoubtedly understandable to every Muslim because it is strong in condemnation of the Crusader Infidels. Bin Laden’s multipurpose declaration was a necessary instrument to mobilize a very divided population of supporters. Active support for al Qaeda hails from a broad range of professional classes, teachers, engineers, students, and from a diverse array of ethnic groups. Even more troubling is the knowledge that both Sunni and Shiite Muslim groups may support al Qaeda training and initiatives as a result

of a June 1996 union between al Qaeda and Hezbollah International. The unique characteristic of al Qaeda is that its insurgent and terrorist activities come from a remarkable array of supporters whose culture, race, and professional background may vary significantly, but who nevertheless are so committed to the movement that they will sacrifice themselves for it. In most cases, a radical fundamentalist religious belief provides their common connection or bond. Many Muslim communities may see the world from the perspective of an underclass, whose most personal sense of identity is also challenged by Western values, the ubiquity and constancy of which highlight an fundamentally and unambiguously successful culture that visibly dominates the communications, commerce, technology, and global security arenas.⁹

Through his al Qaeda network, Osama bin Laden employed his interpretive and distorted view of Islam as an instrument to mobilize warriors behind the ideological banner of *jihad*. However, *jihad* is one of the basic tasks assigned for Muslims by the Prophet. This word, which generally translates to ‘striving,’ was usually cited in the context of striving in the path of God’ and was interpreted to mean an armed struggle for the advancement or defense of Muslim power. In theory, *jihad* was divided into two houses: the House of Islam in which a Muslim polity ruled and Muslim law predominated, and the House of War, the remainder of the world, still populated and more saliently, reigned over by infidels. “Between the two, there was to be a perpetual state of war until the entire world either embraced Islam or submitted to the rule of the Muslim state.” Likewise, the language for describing *jihad* has not changed very much over the centuries. A 16th-century Ottoman scholar described *jihad* as an obligation not just for every individual, but for the entire Muslim community. According to this scholar, the struggle should be continuous and should last forever. Therefore that peace with the infidel is not possible even though a Muslim commander or ruler or commander may negotiate a temporary break in fighting if it is to the benefit of a Muslim community. However, such a cessation of hostilities would not be considered legally binding.¹⁰

In a philosophical and spiritual sense, *jihad* is contained within a mythical paradigm of Islamic orthodoxy and is thus a force within Islam that can create a society devoted to the service of god. This is salient in several respects. One, many Muslims espouse the perspective that this is a time of crisis for Islam. For them, it is not only the West that poses a grave threat to the Muslim community, but it is also the apostate rulers, or satraps, who rule oppressive governments within the lands of Islam that pose a threat. Two, *jihad* is a pathway to a renaissance within Islam, but that renewal necessitates a spiritual as well as an armed struggle. Three, no one is excluded from this struggle because Islam is in peril at its very core. Lastly, this collective defense of the House of Islam animates a feeling of unity for all Muslims—an encomium for the perpetual struggle that frames the Islamic

experience in mythical terms. As it is applied to *jihad*, Islamic law emphasizes the centrality of perpetual struggle as a condition of the religion.¹¹

We avoid the construct, but it is for America's current jihadist foes a religious war starting centuries ago and lasting until judgment day. It is this mindset that has been grafted upon the tactics of contemporary terrorism. The two now flow together, applying jihadist codes of operation to a terrorist repertoire. It is a powerful and dangerous combination. Like all religious fanatics, they see themselves as morally superior, armed with the sword of God, commanded to wage holy war.¹²

Osama bin Laden has wrapped himself in the banner of *jihad* and submerged himself in an endless and "a historical story of Islam." That this story has been so fervently and frequently replayed is not astonishing. What is amazing is how the West ignores its claim and also forgets the refrain of a community that has lost its way. Even though the United States has characterized al Qaeda as a terrorist network as though it were a syndicate of criminal gangs, it benefits from the support, sometimes passive, of millions of Muslims across the globe. It is not difficult to discern how Osama bin Laden views himself either. Like the Prophet Mohammed, bin Laden sees himself as "the warrior prodigal with his band of *mujahideen*, sweeping out of the desert to renew a degenerate Arabia—an Arabia run by a subverted kingdom, which in turn is run by foreign infidels." Bin Laden, moreover, has declared in his decree against the Jews and the Crusaders that the duty of every capable Muslim is to kill civilian and military Americans and their allies, wherever possible, until the US armed forces and their coalition allies have vacated the lands of Islam and no longer pose a threat to Muslims.¹³

According to one RAND expert on Islamic ideology, four ideological positions fundamentally prevail throughout the Muslim world today: secularists, traditionalists, modernists, and fundamentalists. Two of these are most salient in the global struggle against nihilistic terrorists—the fundamentalists and the modernists.

On the one hand, the fundamentalists reject contemporary Western culture and eschew democratic values. They seek a Draconian and authoritarian state to promulgate an extreme interpretation of Islamic morality and law. They are able and willing to adapt, innovate, and leverage modern technology. Fundamentalists are in no way averse to any type of violence against all types of targets. Unlike scriptural fundamentalists, radical fundamentalists "are much less concerned with the literal substance of Islam, with which they take considerable liberties either deliberately or because of the ignorance of orthodox Islamic doctrine." The Taliban, al Qaeda, and a host of other radical Islamic radical movements and groups are

subsumed within this category across the globe. On the other hand, modernists want the Islamic world to become part of the modern world. They aspire to reform Islam to reconcile it with modernity. They deliberately seek a far-sweeping transformation of the contemporary orthodox interpretation and practice of Islam. Furthermore, their core values—a community based on social responsibility, equality, and freedom, and individual conscience—are not incongruous to modern democratic principles.¹⁴

Ideology notwithstanding, the *mujahideen* veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War initially provided the nucleus of al Qaeda's fighting force. Their incentives to continue to fight and to prosecute *jihad* elsewhere were manifold: an innate desire to continue in meaningful activity, survival of their organization, and their inflated self-image as a consequence of defeating a superpower. Moreover, their like-minded Taliban brethren's subsequent victories against other factions in Afghanistan guaranteed sanctuary for al Qaeda's holy warriors and safe haven for its training camps, which graduated thousands more *jihad* volunteers. What Osama bin Laden and his associates contributed to this strong but unfocused pool of veterans was a sense of mission, vision, and strategy that conflated the 20th-century theory of a unified Islamic political power with a renaissance of the Islamic caliphate paradigm. It reframed myriad local conflicts into one singular struggle between a genuine form of Islam and a host of corrupt rulers who would fall without the backing of the West and the United States, in particular. By expunging the conceptual borders between individual states and their wars, al Qaeda then was able to draw its recruits and operatives from a bigger pool of humanity. Secured in the haven of Afghanistan, sufficiently funded, supported by Pakistan, and animated by a powerful ideology, al Qaeda became the rallying banner of Islam's answer to past frustrations, humiliations, trepidations, and defeats.¹⁵

In their view, they had already driven the Russians out of Afghanistan, in a defeat so overwhelming that it led directly to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Having overcome the superpower that they had always regarded as more formidable, they felt ready to take on the other; in this they were encouraged by the opinion, often expressed by Osama bin Laden, among others, that America was a paper tiger. Their hatred is neither constrained by fear nor diluted by respect.¹⁶

The *mujahideen* from the Afghan war were a proven force as a result of their training and war experiences fighting the Soviets. Although this group was ethnically heterogeneous, its members were linked by al Qaeda's base network and by their collective trust in bin Laden's leadership. "They were a brotherhood, which had come together in the crucible of the same war and had passed to and from

Afghanistan through the same al Qaeda system to return as legitimate citizens in their 50 different countries of origin.” Bin Laden has and does use them as an instrument of his attacks on the West. The largest part of the force, numbering in the tens of thousands, was organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces in the crucible of the Soviet-Afghan war. A large number in this pool hailed from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. They had fought in Bosnia; US forces had encountered some of them in Somalia. Another group, which is approximately 10,000 strong, lives in Western states and have received combat training of some shape or form. A third group has approximately several thousand members and is capable of commanding the aforementioned forces. A couple of hundred individuals, which include both heads of known terrorist organizations and officials operating with or without the authority of their state governments, make up the al Qaeda network’s top command structure. Osama bin Laden most likely viewed the events of 2001 as a renewal of the struggle for the religious domination of the globe, one that started back in the seventh century. It created another moment of opportunity for him and his underlings. To them, “America exemplifies the civilization and embodies the leadership of the House of War, and, like Rome and Byzantium, it has become degenerate and demoralized, ready to be overthrown.”¹⁷

In addition to a common ideology and a common bond derived from the crucible of the Soviet war, many or most members of the al Qaeda group come from the lands of the East, whose warriors for centuries have embraced a way of warfare distinct and different from the Western way of war. The preferred style of combat in the Eastern way of warfare for a span of almost 3,000 years was the horse warrior: “That was, indeed, one in which evasion, delay, and indirectness were paramount.” The horse warriors elected to fight from a distance and to employ missiles instead of edged weapons; when confronted, they would withdraw with determination and count upon wearing down an enemy by prolongation and attrition rather than by defeating him in one single trial of arms. According to one popular military writer, the enemies we will most likely fight in the future will not be soldiers with the discipline, modernity, and orthodoxy that term evokes in the West, but warriors, defined as “erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order.” These barbaric warriors, unlike Western warrior soldiers, do not play by rules, do not respect conventions, and do not comply with unpleasant orders.

Warriors have always been around, but with the rise of professional soldieries their importance was eclipsed. Now, thanks to the confluence of fragmented former empires, stateless global insurgents, and the diminution of a warrior ethos in parts of the post-modern West, the warrior thug has returned to the fore, with more financing, arms, and brutality than since the 14th century. A big danger that we face is savage warriors who do not recognize the civilized constraints by which we

operate and who will do absolutely anything to achieve their ends. Germinating in the Hobbesian deprivation of overpopulated and ravaged wastelands, or frustrated over their cultural defeat in Muslim lands, these warriors not only commit atrocities but they seem to derive immense pleasure in doing so. The decapitation fad is but one testimony to the barbaric proclivities of the stateless ‘warriors’ of the 21st century.¹⁸

Many Muslims also may harbor deep feelings of resentment and humiliation as a consequence of the relatively bloodless seizure of Baghdad and the perceived unchecked projection of American power and influence into the region. Al Qaeda’s adept propagandists effectively translated the US coalitions’ seizure of Baghdad and the subsequent occupation of Iraq as the latest in a series of ignominious historical Western conquests of Muslims for which there must be retaliation. Although the voice of radical Islamic terrorism speaks of targeting the entire West as its enemy, its offensive is now directed principally against the United States as the very essence of Western supremacy and civilization.

What’s more alarming, however, is that al Qaeda’s resiliency, along with its potential longevity, does not stem from the agglomeration of *jihadists* that it may have trained or not trained in the past, but more from its continued capacity to recruit, to mobilize, and to inspire both current and future fighters and supporters. In a different form and with a different modus operandi, the al Qaeda group and its associates are 21st-century barbarians: instead of directly invading our heartland across our frontiers, they hide in the hinterland of the have-not world; they recruit, train, and proliferate from the sanctuary; and they conspire to plan indirect and insidious attacks against population centers and against symbols of American power abroad. As a final footnote, one expert on asymmetric warfare noted, “A fourth generation may emerge from emerge from non-Western cultural traditions, such as Islamic or Asiatic traditions.” Moreover, the fact that some non-Western adversaries in the Islamic world are not inherently strong in technology will compel them to develop and employ fourth-generation warfare (asymmetry) through *ideas* rather than technology.¹⁹

Ourselves: The Western Way of Warfare

The Mamelukes once represented a military and culture whose way of warfare predominated. However, their approach to warfare became so embedded and ossified in their military culture that the Mamelukes became incapable of adapting to changes in warfare. The Mamelukes were slave soldiers and were essentially the professional core of the armies in many Muslim states. Moreover, they frequently became the rulers of such states, with Mameluke leaders remaining in power for generations. However, instead of using their power to legally liberate themselves, the Mamelukes ardently perpetuated this institutional culture and resisted all pressure

to change. The rationale for the Mameluke resistance to change is understandable but not excusable because they ultimately contributed to their own demise. Since Mameluke military preeminence stemmed from a monopoly of the elaborate skills of horsemanship and archery, they were afraid to abandon these skills for the common practices of musketry or fighting on foot since this would remove them from their position of military primacy. The rigidity of the Mameluke military culture, similar to the culture of the Zulus, is what undid them in the end. "Though their political power derived from their military exclusivity, they preferred to persist in their outmoded warrior style rather than adapt to new ways in warfare." Likewise the Zulus had developed a very effective military culture that was so rigid, however, that it contributed to their demise.²⁰

Shaka was a perfect Clausewitzian. He designed a military system to preserve and protect a way of life, which it did with dramatic efficiency. Zulu culture, by making warrior values paramount, by linking those values to the preservation of a cattle-herding-economy, and by locking up the energies and imagination of the most dynamic members of the community in sterile military bondage until well past maturity, denied itself the chance to evolve and adapt to the world around it. In short, the rise and fall of the Zulu nation offers an awful warning of the shortcomings of the Clausewitzian analysis.²¹

The early 21st-century security environment again engenders a contradiction between military cultures and the essence of modern war that presents traditional Western military institutions with a dilemma. Enemies of the West solve the dilemma by eliminating the culture of order. The members of al Qaeda and the terrorist groups associated with it do not wear uniforms, don formal ranks, conduct drill, or render salutes. It is quite possible that the global insurgents who wage war against Western culture in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere have or are developing a military culture that is congruous with the unruly character of modern war. The broader non-Western culture from which many of these terrorists hail is also a variable that may nurture this phenomenon.

To be certain, today the United States and its allies face a panoply of enemies whose various aims are best achieved by avoiding or mitigating US military superiority, attacking American cities, and disrupting its commerce. This type of war is not the preferred paradigm for a military culture that has exhibited an embedded preference for conventional war. Preferred wars are ones that are consistent with conventional doctrinal templates centered on firepower and maneuver. Fourth Generation-like wars are also least preferred their characteristics tend to dampen the West's obvious advantages in technology and resources. The current and

emerging enemies of the United States will wage wars “that compel us to rethink our assumptions, to reconfigure our forces, and to reinvigorate our alliances.”²²

Some assert that a distinctively Western way of warfare can be traced through the history of American and Western military history all the way back to the Greeks and Romans. The Greeks had instituted a new kind of warfare for themselves that emphasized the purpose of battle as a decisive action, “fought within the dramatic unities of time, place, and action and dedicated to securing victory, even at the risk of suffering bloody defeat, in a single test of skill and courage.” The legions of Rome adopted and improved upon the Greeks’ methods. The Roman legions were without peer on the conventional battlefield but the German barbarians attacked them in wooded and hilly terrain. Arminius’ Germanic guerrillas ambushed and harassed Varus’ three legions. Poor leadership, inclement weather, inflexible tactics, unfavorable terrain, and a cunning and imaginative opponent mitigated the Roman advantages in discipline, technology, and training. The legions maintained their unit cohesion as best as they could but they ultimately yielded to attrition and exhaustion. The survivors were taken prisoner and crucified, buried alive, or offered as living sacrifices to the pagan gods. Three legions perished in the Teutoburg forest and Arminius had the heads of key Roman leaders spiked to the trees as an admonition to Rome. The German barbarians also ripped apart the half-burned body of Varus, decapitated it, and had it delivered to the Caesar Augustus who subsequently decided that the barbarian territories beyond the Danube in northern Germany were too tough for his legions to colonize.²³

During the years leading up to World War II, America’s military-strategic culture embraced a concept of war derived from the Civil War. America’s strategic aim of completely imposing its political aims upon the vanquished, therefore, would be achieved by applying overwhelming and decisive combat power to destroy the enemy’s armed forces and by destroying the enemy’s economic resources and will to fight. World War II shaped US military culture in a huge way because it validated and further embedded the cultural predilections for big conventional wars of decision. Officers in the American Army had been able to prepare themselves for the transition from a small peacetime Army in 1940 to the World War II Army in part because the US Army had embraced the traditions of the only big, European-style war in its history—the American Civil War. One military policy expert noted that, “the Civil War had molded the American army’s conceptions of the nature of full-scale war in ways that would profoundly affect its conduct of the Second World War.” The remembered memory of the Civil War pointed to massive force as the principal military principle.²⁴

Competition between powerful European and Eurasian states in the military sphere before and after World War II, moreover, produced a homogeneity of

military thinking and doctrine that emphasized conventional maneuver and firepower aimed at the annihilation of other symmetrically inclined armies with like aims. One can presuppose that this homogenization emerged in different regions according to two cultural patterns—the blitzkrieg pattern and the guerrilla warfare pattern. On the one hand, the metric for success in the blitzkrieg pattern was the capacity to raise and employ large armored and mechanized formations designed to destroy an opponent's armed forces. On the other hand, the metric for success in the guerrilla warfare pattern was the capacity to wage a protracted war against a technologically superior opponent. The blitzkrieg preference emphasizes a direct strategic approach whereas the guerrilla warfare preference emphasizes an indirect strategic approach. Throughout the previous century, Western militaries, especially the American military, were surprisingly consistent in how they waged war. They have developed an unusual ability to translate national treasure, an industrial base capacity, and technological innovation into an orthodox battlefield overmatch. However, the composition and character of non-Western military entities are changing as they develop concepts for defeating the firepower-centric methods engendered by the American way of war. The imperative to remain effective and to survive against overwhelming firepower is compelling enemies to disperse and hide while adapting or eliminating the cumbersome logistics and transportation tails that still afflict the Western way of war.²⁵

The biggest mistake the US military leadership committed in Vietnam was attempting to fight a guerrilla enemy the same way it had fought the German army in World War II. US forces staged large-unit operational sweeps with sexy names like JUNCTION CITY and one with the historically ironic moniker of "Operation FRANCIS MARION." US airplanes also dropped more than 7 million tons of bombs, exceeding 300 times the explosive power of the atomic bombs it dropped on Japan in World War II. Neither the big-unit sweeps nor the 'bomb-them-into-the-Stone-Age' method had much effect on a guerrilla enemy who hid in the jungles and then emerged when he chose to ambush American soldiers. Moreover, the lack of knowledge about how best to win the support of the population was at the center the American military's doctrinal challenges in Vietnam. The US Army's doctrine for operations against insurgent forces, then prescribed by its capstone manual FM 100-5 *Operations*, emphasized the destruction of the guerrilla units. "Despite the intimation that elimination of the guerrillas might not solve the country's problems, *Operations*, with its aggressively offensive nature, pointed the advisers squarely at the PLAF guerrillas as their objectives and not the South Vietnamese people." Moreover, much of the Pentagon's interpretation of transformation also remains focused on decisive and orthodox battles instead of small wars and insurgencies. Consequently, according to two military experts, the US armed forces have neither dedicated adequate resources to thinking about

protracted counterinsurgencies nor did they establish the doctrine, training, and equipment to wage small wars effectively.²⁶

This Kind of War—A Potential Revolution in Guerrilla Warfare

*The Pentagon's focus on rapid, decisive operations is largely irrelevant in this type of war.*²⁷

*We have made every mistake known and even re-invented some new ones. Perhaps, the greatest oversights are the political/military nature of the struggle; the need for unity of command of the US political-military efforts, and the need for security in order to execute the economic and political programs.*²⁸

A strategic paradox exists when an ostensibly militarily superior power confronts a seemingly inferior opponent because the superior power has unlimited means but generally has limited aims; the obverse is true for the outmatched opponent. Such a paradox inheres in the war against al Qaeda because the United States has characterized this war as a war on terrorism. However, this somewhat limited definition of the enemy has formed the basis of a US strategy that employs limited means to achieve its ends and has not properly identified the war's wider scope as an insurgency being waged by non-state armed groups. Terrorism is neither an enemy nor an objective, but a tactic or method. Declaring war against a method does not seem rational, yet, an accurate conception about what type of war one is prosecuting is one of Clausewitz's foremost maxims. A more rational conception of the conflict is as a global insurgency being waged against the international system of states, particularly those states with large Muslim populations. The enemy commonly employs classic insurgency methods within failing or failed Islamic states.

Osama bin Laden himself has underscored the asymmetric merits of insurgent warfare and has consistently lauded the victory that he maintains was realized by employing this approach against American forces in Somalia. Bin Laden also proclaimed in his 1996 declaration of war, "That, due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy armed forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e., using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy." Thus, the other half of this strategic paradox has al Qaeda and its associates using limited but networked and technology-enabled means, to wage total war against the secular regimes in the Middle East, against Israel, and against the West. It operates like this with the nominally passive, but sometimes active, support of the world's Muslim population. Its aim is total—to undo the Western state system and to establish a caliphate, imposing an interpretive version of universal Islamic law under its rule. Al Qaeda is simply one of the principal fighting arms of a radical Islamic fundamentalist insurgency that is metastasizing within greater Islam.²⁹

Chronic decade-long wars simmer or persist in many parts of the world: Burma,

Colombia, India, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Basque region of Spain, and Thailand. The threats we face today are likely to engage us for many years. America's terrorist enemies view war as a perpetual condition and they are resolved to attack the United States and the West, to destroy domestic tranquility, disrupt economies, and make our lifestyle untenable. The West now confronts a more complex panoply of recalcitrant threats: large-scale terrorist attacks that may occur anywhere in the world, including the US homeland; the continuing development in some countries of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that these may come into the hands of political or criminal gangs; recurring warfare that in some countries has become a profitable economic enterprise; local and regional ethnic tribal conflicts that may suddenly convulse into humanitarian disasters and genocide or that may preserve chaotic ungoverned areas where warlords and terrorists find refuge; increasingly networked organized crime engaged in drug trafficking, the smuggling of human beings, and possibly trafficking in the ingredients of weapons of mass destruction; the exploitation of the Internet by criminals or terrorists; and the potential for complex remote sabotage. Especially salient for to those make national security strategy, these evolving perils are not consistent with how the West has organized—military assets, troops, planning scenarios—to manage national security.³⁰

Guerrilla war is a primordial and timeless form of warfare, but now it is metamorphosing into a global and transnational phenomenon. However, much of our strategic culture stems from of a social and political construct that gradually developed during the Middle Ages and that was ultimately realized and codified during the age of the Enlightenment. The secular state is a modern concept that replaced monarchies and coexisted with the independent city-states in Europe as recently as the early 20th century. What al Qaeda rejects and is attacking is this Western construct of a secular nation-state. Fanaticism and barbarism are not novel but what is new is the coupling of barbaric and asymmetric methods with a global and radical Islamic fundamentalist ideology that supplies a potentially endless line of recruits and allies for this world war. These nihilistic Luddites have leveraged the values of liberal Western polities—freedoms, openness, and technology—to bring the war to the core of the empire.³¹

According to one British expert on counterinsurgency, “Osama bin Laden and his international network have expanded the definition of insurgency to include a global dimension.” Al Qaeda's methods are broadly germane and appealing to other similarly dispersed terrorist groups. Osama bin Laden's adaptive model of organization is a very significant product of global change that enables global insurgency as an option where the weak can effectively challenge the strong. The al Qaeda movement's sources of support and energy, the nature of its organization, the environment in which it operates, are all global and transnational. The international

scope of their organization, objectives, intent, recruiting base, and their organization differentiates global guerrillas from popular guerillas operating within one region or state. The global insurgent “faces the most formidable opposition forces of all and, in its effort to survive, becomes a dangerous and highly organized manifestation of insurgency, with a demonstrated capacity to attack the heart of powerful countries and to survive intensive counter-measures.” As additional examples of the enemy network’s propensity for insurgency on a regional and global scale, a 9 April 2003 declaration posted on al Qaeda’s phantom web site (al Neda), under the caption, “Guerrilla Warfare is the Most Powerful Weapon Muslims Have and it is the Best Method to Continue the Conflict with the Crusader Enemy,” states “the successful attempts of dealing defeat to invaders using guerrilla warfare were many, and we will not expound on them. However, these attempts have proven that the most effective method for the materially weak against the materially strong is guerrilla warfare.” Moreover, a former Egyptian army special forces officer named Saif al-Adel, one of al Qaeda’s most senior operational commanders, has promoted “the use of guerrilla warfare tactics against the American and British forces in Iraq” and provided explicit and copious practical guidance on how to carry them out.³²

Current US Army doctrine defines insurgency as “an armed political movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government, or separation from it, through use of subversion and armed conflict.” It is a protracted political-military conflict aimed at undermining government legitimacy and increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency. The goal of an insurgency is to mobilize material and human resources to establish an alternative counter-state. Effective mobilization enables active and passive support for the insurgency’s programs, operations, and goals. Loyalty to the insurgent movement is usually garnered by acts but may also be won by through abstract tenets. On the one hand, pledges to eliminate poverty or end hunger may attract to a portion of the people. On the other hand, the desire to eliminate a foreign occupation or to establish a government based on religious or political ideology may attract other parts of the population.

Army doctrine states that the most potent ideologies harness “latent, emotive concerns of the populace, such as the desire for justice, the creation of an idealized religious state, or liberation from foreign occupation.” Moreover, ideology shapes and animates the insurgents’ perception of the environment by providing the lens, to include analytical categories and lexicon by which conditions are assessed. The effect is that the ideology influences the guerrilla movement’s operational and organizational methods. Another current study on insurgency by the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute underscores the importance of ideology and leaders who can employ that ideology to “unify diverse groups and organizations

and impose their will under situations of high stress.” Psychologically, successful guerrilla leaders are so devoted to their movement that they will persevere although their odds of success are very unfavorable. They become true-faith apostles motivated by vision. Likewise, effective insurgent leaders believe so fervently in their movement that they become absolutely ruthless and capable of doing almost anything to weaken the counterinsurgent forces and to protect their cause.³³

Unfortunately, globalization and information-age technology have enabled a near-revolutionary transformation and conflation of insurgency and terrorism. According to the same Army War College study cited above, “Insurgency is likely to continue to mutate or evolve.” For example, insurgencies may become increasingly networked, with no centralized command and no common strategy, only a unifying objective. This would make them less effective in terms of seizing power or attaining other political goals but more resilient in the face of regime counterinsurgency operations. Information technology and networking has enabled the linkage of a host various insurgent movements and like-minded organizations, including transnational criminal organizations that operate regionally and globally. The ideological underpinnings of insurgent activities have also metamorphosed. A unifying ideology based on transnational and radical Islam predominates and there are very few insurgencies still based on the Marxist ideology that use to hold primacy in the context of guerrilla warfare. Radical fundamentalist Islam poses a greater and potentially more complex menace than Marxism posed. For example, clerics play a critical role in political and ideological mobilization but they are not considered acceptable targets. What’s more, since radical Islam emphasizes the transcendental and the spiritual, it animates humans of massive destruction—suicide bombers who were not common phenomena in the previous context of secular Marxist insurgencies.³⁴

The resurgence of Islamic ideology is a critical factor in this insurgency, making the war as much about Western values as about military prowess. Pursuing a purely military campaign could lead to the asphyxiation or contraction of those values by the gradual decay of domestic civil liberties. This would also help fulfill one of al Qaeda’s war aims to expand the schism between the West and the Islamic world. Although the counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq certainly have military dimensions, the principal focus should be ideological, political, and economic. America and its allies will not be successful by using military force alone; they will be successful if they can strengthen local reformers and allies; and if they steer clear of imposing their own political values. On a global level, victory in the struggle against radical fundamentalist Islam and al Qaeda cannot be achieved so long as popular resentment at the United States in the Islamic world is influenced by perceptions that America is too close to Israel to move forward on the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Western military victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan and

coalition attacks against a host of Islamic fighters in Iraq have further intensified radical Islamic resentment. Although some have viewed Iraq as an imprudent detour from the critical targets in this global counterinsurgency, it has in fact sucked in al Qaeda supporters where few existed under Saddam's secular regime. Furthermore, the *madrassas* are still inculcating and proliferating far more *jihad* fighters daily than the West could ever catch or kill. Al Qaeda, though weakened, still operates as a cross-channeled and networked virtual entity in a loose coalition with supporters in 90 different states.³⁵

Insurgency is a method adopted by political organizations that cannot otherwise achieve their aims by normal means. "It is a strategy of desperation used by those too weak to do otherwise." Insurgents avoid the sphere of conventional pitched battle where they are relatively weaker and focus in those areas where they can take the edge off asymmetrically, especially in the political and the psychological domains. The global insurgent is characterized by the international dispersal of his organization, and he thrives in a state of statelessness that is attained by the multiethnic nature of the movement and by this very geographic dispersal. This war against radical Islam is a guerrilla war: one waged not within a state but one waged across states. Each guerrilla action is intended to provoke an overreaction that will increase the guerrilla's popular support within Islamic communities. The enemy aggressor, moreover, has a discernible organization: forces organized for direct combat or terror operations, a pool of dispersed individuals with varying degrees of training, commanders in the field, and senior leadership.³⁶

One well-argued essay has postulated that al Qaeda represents a new wave in warfare because it has adopted a complex organizational structure and because it exploits a powerful mix of high- and low-technology means of warfare. Capable of organizing insurgency on a global scale, its operators are transnational 'super-empowered' individuals who are no longer constrained by traditional state borders. Another author and an apostle of fourth generation warfare claimed that "the genesis of an idea-based fourth generation may be visible in terrorism." Terrorists like those in al Qaeda survive off the land and take haven in their enemies' backyards. Moreover, their dispersed area of operation includes the totality of the enemy's civil society. Many of the characteristics of this global insurgency and terror network also indicate a possible shift toward a next generation of warfare. One way to identify or discern that war may be witnessing the emergence of a fourth generation is the fact that it seems difficult to arrive at an appropriate moniker for the enemy—names have ranged from non-compliant forces (NCF) and anti-coalition militia (ACM) to Opposition Militia Forces (OMF), or, simply to just terrorists, extremists, or thugs. However, many of the activities of these non-state armed groups without territorial-based armies do approximate guerrilla warfare. One military expert has commented that the current methods and tactics employed by our enemies

should not be surprising in view of the last 50 years of Western victories over Islamic armies in conventional wars. Since the Israeli war of independence, when fighting conventional Western-style war, Islamic armies have lost seven wars and won none. However, when fighting unconventional wars against Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union, Islamic forces have won five and lost none, with the outcome of the war in Iraq as yet undetermined.³⁷

Al Qaeda and its allies have shown some resilience in the face of American-led efforts to curb their aims. The clandestine nature of these organizations has enabled them to maintain organizations in the darkness whereas their hit-and-run tactics continue to protract the wars they wage in an attempt to erode the legitimacy of the target governments. The longer bin Laden and al Qaeda survive, the larger its following will become as more Muslims across the globe see this *jihad* not as an abstract theological form of hope but as an effective and legitimate way to take action on their anger. The Middle East offers fertile soil in which to generate a revolution, and al Qaeda has harnessed the potential for recruitment in the region more than any other organization. In promulgating its own political agenda, al Qaeda has been able to draw from a reserve of despair and antipathy within the Middle East that has improved its standing within the Islamic community in general. Confronted with repressive regimes, daunting poverty levels, poor educational opportunities, and economic stagnation, Muslims throughout the Middle East have seethed with rage as they found their once-magnificent culture marginalized and enfeebled by America and the West. It is in this environment of despondence and anger that Osama bin Laden's call for a renaissance of traditional Muslim values and caliphate rule has found broad appeal. By effectively employing psychological warfare, or the propaganda war for the 'hearts and minds' of the people, bin Laden has made his political aims reverberate throughout the Muslim world. What's more, al Qaeda has made media and publicity one of its four operational committees, on an equal footing with its military, finance, and *fatwa* and Islamic study committees. They have carried out a successful information warfare strategy that draws on the heroic framework of Islam to deny combatant commanders access to the Middle Eastern population for their own information warfare inroads. Because al Qaeda's information warfare campaign "emphasizes the idealized return to fundamental religious values and the rejection of both technological and political modernity," the United States and coalition's messages of nation building and democratization may not carry weight with that audience.³⁸

Radical Islamic ideology is also apparent among the Chechen separatist fighters who have adopted the slogans and garbs of Islamic extremist fighters in other parts of the world. In fact, a segment of the Chechen separatists have blended tribal and nationalist aims with the tactics and ideology of groups such as al Qaeda. A merging of the Chechen ethno-national code of *adat* and *Wahhabism* has emerged

within the ranks of the Chechen insurgents. Osama bin Laden himself has proclaimed that the Chechen insurgency is part of his global religious war, and al Qaeda's interest in the region is undisputed. As early as 1997, bin Laden declared that Chechnya was an incubator for religious war and that it was among the regions where infidels are perpetrating injustice against Muslims. It is evident that at least the demonstration effect of Islamic extremism has had an influence on the insurgents' methods in the Chechen war since the Chechens now perpetrate large-scale attacks and, increasingly, use suicide bombings more to spread fear and shock than to achieve a military objective. The Chechen guerrillas have also borrowed al Qaeda's method of acquiring funds channeled through organizations posing as charities. What's more, international funds have helped pay and arm fighters with significant amounts of monies coming from outside Chechnya, from places such as the Gulf, Europe, and even North America.³⁹

Conclusion

*Shock and awe campaigns, it seems, are only the price of admission to the war on terror; the counterinsurgencies that follow are the main show. Indeed, Iraq is not a strategic anomaly in the present geopolitical order. From southern Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa and east to the Philippine archipelago, American troops are engaged in similarly open-ended, low-level counterinsurgency operations against Islamist guerrillas. In each of these places, there is no clash of armies on barren planes; no clearly definable enemy force that can be decisively or swiftly annihilated; and few statues of dictators left to tear down.*⁴⁰

One conception is that the current war against al Qaeda and sponsors of terrorism is a global insurgency requiring a counterinsurgency strategy on a global scale. Thus, to achieve some sort of permanent peace in the war against radical fundamentalist Islam, a comprehensive long-term counterinsurgency strategy that integrates national and international resources and agencies on a global scale is necessary. Many would agree that a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a *sine qua non* for achieving a peaceful resolution to what will be a prolonged war. Others advocate for regime change, or at least regime modification in Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia as other preconditions for undermining radical fundamentalist Islam and the ideological rationale behind the *jihad* against the West. Yet, these radical fundamentalists are products of the non-Western world and as such they are a measure of how well the sole superpower and its like-minded Western friends are bringing security and hope to those lawless areas missing out on the benefits of modernity. There are perfectly rational reasons why a group like al Qaeda sought sanctuary in places such as Afghanistan and Sudan—they were two of the least globalized and poorly governed countries on the planet. Part of the solution therefore also includes efforts to increase the number of states in the zone of 'peace and stability' while concomitantly decreasing the number of states in the zone of 'war

and turmoil.’ This short conclusion distills some ideas about how to approach such a long-term and coherent strategy for peace.⁴¹

One of the foremost experts on al Qaeda, Rohan Gunaratna, has asserted that every Muslim country from Tunisia to Indonesia must counter the Islamist threat. He advocates that the international community develop punitive and prophylactic measures aimed at targeting the supply and demand side of al Qaeda. With as much ardor, the West must impose sanctions and penalties on those governments or organizations that provide sanctuary to al Qaeda and its allies. More self-evidently, a ruthless global, regional, and national manhunt for al Qaeda’s leaders, members, and supporters must continue until they are all captured or killed. Gunaratna also promotes “irresistible incentives for al Qaeda defectors; and attractive rewards for information leading to the arrests of al Qaeda operatives or disruption of al Qaeda plans and preparations.”

The military dimension is only one part, and not the principal one, of a broader strategy of implementing political and socio-economic and political reforms. To ruin al Qaeda’s appeal in Muslim eyes the West must discredit al Qaeda’s ideology because as long as it is perceived as legitimate and influential, its allies and membership will grow. However, the widespread support it enjoys today is underlined by the strong perception among Muslims that the West has consistently done them wrong. The invasion of Iraq, according to Gunaratna, “acutely exacerbated” this belief because Iraq is a country whose Islamic sites and history are second only to Saudi Arabia in importance as symbols to Muslims. Since wider support from Muslim societies is essential to win the fight against al Qaeda and its brand of Islamist terrorism, there must be a coherent plan by the international community to remedy the perceived and actual complaints of the moderate Muslims. In the end, al Qaeda’s existence will be determined by the ability and the willingness of the “anti-terrorist coalition to destroy its leadership, to counter its ideology, to marginalize its support, and to disrupt its recruitment.”⁴²

As stated in another work published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), to be sustainable, any global counterinsurgency strategy must harness all elements of national and international power rather than imposing the burden on the military instrument almost exclusively. This SSI monograph postulates that a complete understanding of the current strategic environment must differentiate between wars waged by states and wars waged by non-state armed groups that lack legitimate status. Even though Westerners may perceive terrorism as barbaric and reprehensible, many populations in the Third World may perceive it as the only way to fight against internal or external occupation or oppression. The author of this SSI piece argues that, instead of declaring war on terrorism, “We must, instead, declare war on specific aggressors, those lacking legitimate status within the international

system of states and using destructive force across state boundaries against the United States.” Al Qaeda is a base or network for a host of organizations that is a loose coalition of groups and individuals lacking state sovereignty. There are about 30 or so organizations with a coincidence of interests that tend to reside and seek sanctuary in failing states. Since there are at least 30 failing states, however, “Unilateral invasion, occupation, and nation-building constitute an exhaustive strategy that cannot be sustained.” Any strategy that depends on remaking Islamic states situated within the arc of instability into modern (Western) democracies is genuinely a strategy of exhaustion and may equate to the “height of hubris.”⁴³

Another more recent SSI analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency challenges whether the question of when and how to engage in counterinsurgency support should be an all-or-nothing issue in US strategy. This study suggests that there should perhaps be a corollary to the Powell Doctrine that prescribes that America only embark on counterinsurgencies if the interests are vital and it is willing to see the effort through to the end, even if a significant commitment of personnel and resources will be required for more than 10 years. Moreover, Steve Metz and Ray Millen assert that the United States must determine whether its strategy for counterinsurgency operations is one of management or victory. “Traditional thinking is that victory, defined as the eradication of the insurgency as a political and military force and the amelioration of the factors that allowed it to emerge in the first place, is the appropriate goal.” However, a management or containment approach to counterinsurgency may have merit, especially in view of the United States’ ongoing commitments to counterinsurgency worldwide and the concomitant resources and time required to achieve total victory in counterinsurgency. A containment strategy would possibly differentiate between different types of insurgencies and commit the American military only to countering those insurgencies related to the support or sanctuary of international terrorism. It may be plausible to “adopt a strategy of intervention and stabilization when necessary without an attempt to transform the societies or and without committing to a protracted counterinsurgency.”⁴⁴

Ultimately the Metz and Millen study recommends adopting an interagency effects-based approach to counterinsurgency planning that concentrates on the following essential aims: rupture the insurgent movement through political, psychological, and military means, to include direct strikes, fracturing and using groups against each other, and offering amnesties; destroy the legitimacy of the insurgent movement in the view of the local population and any international community; demoralize the insurgent movement by establishing and maintaining the perception that long-term trends are undesirable; sever the insurgents’ external and internal support by isolating or destroying its logistical and political ties; and cut off the funds of the insurgent movement and cause it to squander those funds that

remain.⁴⁵

In an award-winning essay, author Grant Highland has reiterated that, in an effort to decapitate the insurgency's leadership while improving security at home, the United States must continue to ruthlessly pursue al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Although this is very self-evident, keeping al Qaeda on the run does give the United States time to confront the genuine strategic challenge in this war: to establish a long-term peace in the Middle East, the United States will have to ultimately face and counter the broader insurgency occurring within Islam itself. A bolder project would be to eliminate the global insurgents' external preoccupation with the West to allow their discontent to revert back to internal dissatisfaction. The real strategic challenge is not al Qaeda but the conditions that allowed al Qaeda to germinate in the first case. Those conditions in the arc of instability ostensibly provide al Qaeda with its recruits and its legitimacy.

According to Highland, economic support, diplomacy, and cooperation must be extended to those states in the Middle East that are moving toward reform. The essence of the challenge is the disaffected Muslim populations all over the world. Assisting states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, Malaysia, and Indonesia means encouraging those populations who "found their own their own brand of renewal within the construct of Islam without abrogating modernity" to determine their own political future. Diligent support for these populations, employing all elements of national power, could create the genuine possibility of arresting the Islamic insurgency by demonstrated effect of success in these states. This approach, in fact, would quite possibly defuse the radical hate-filled ideology of al Qaeda and diminish its appeal.⁴⁶

Another expert in international security has proposed that the United States should adopt a 'hearts and minds' strategy that focuses on reducing Islamic hostility toward it instead of pursuing an empire with the sword. Rather than placing US forces on the front lines around the world, in Islamic lands in particular, which increases anti-American resentment, the United States should seek to minimize its military footprint and use force in moderation. According to John Mearsheimer, "Trying to stamp out terrorism with military forces is likely to enrage, not humble, the masses in the Islamic world." That rage in turn translates into antipathy toward America, further causing difficulties for efforts to eradicate al Qaeda. There are four principal components of his 'hearts and minds' strategy. First, the United States should concentrate on destroying al Qaeda and its close affiliates instead of not prosecuting a global war against all terrorist organizations wherever they might emerge. Second, the United States must place the highest emphasis on securing the nuclear weapons and fissile material in the former Soviet Union because terrorists are most likely to obtain a weapon of mass destruction from that environment.

Third, instead of emphasizing military force almost exclusively in its campaign against terror, America should emphasize diplomacy, intelligence, and covert action against al Qaeda. Fourth, America needs to espouse policies that mitigate and arrest the widespread anti-Americanism in the Islamic world.⁴⁷

According to Mearsheimer, adopting an approach like the one outlined above would create an environment whereby states and individuals in that region would less likely support al Qaeda and would more likely be willing to increase their cooperation with the United States against terrorism. The core of the problem is specific American policies: the apparent elation with which the United States employs force against Islamic societies; the US support of repressive satrap regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt; and most significantly, the continued and unqualified support of Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “The United States should make a major effort to end the war between Israel and Palestinians, because that is the only way America can remain close to Israel and still have good relations with the Islamic world. In short, the United States has to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict or distance itself from Israel.”⁴⁸

In any information warfare campaign calculated for the ideological struggle between the West and radical fundamentalist Islam, according to RAND expert Cheryl Bernard, the West should support the modernists to propagate their moderate version of Islam by enabling them with a wide platform to enunciate and disseminate their views. Conversely, the West must thoroughly counter the radical fundamentalists by targeting weaknesses in their Islamic ideological credentials. Bernard advocates that the United States and its allies oppose the fundamentalists’ interpretive and distorted version of Islam in the following way: contest their interpretation of Islam and reveal their inaccuracies; expose their connections to illegal groups and operations; make public the consequences of their associates’ actions; illustrate their inability to develop their countries in positive ways; direct and target the messages to the young, to the devout traditionalists, Muslim minorities in the West, and to women; depict violent terrorists and extremists correctly as disturbed and pusillanimous, not as heroes; persuade journalists to investigate corruption, immorality, and hypocrisy in fundamentalist and terrorist circles; and promote ruptures among fundamentalists.⁴⁹

As a postscript, military cultural change is also an imperative to adopting and sustaining a capacity and predilection for stability operations and counterinsurgency. The US military is adapting from the bottom up, in contact, but it needs to view and value counterinsurgency as a core competency, for the long term. All curricula in its professional military education system must dedicate a much larger share to thinking and planning for counterinsurgency. In the area of doctrine, the new interim Field Manual (FMI) 3-07, *Counterinsurgency Operations* is a start,

but the percentage and quality of Army and joint doctrine for counterinsurgency is still quite small. Doctrinally, there needs to be much more cooperation and collaboration at the joint, interagency, and multinational levels. America does have some allies who have some experiences with success in small wars. Moreover, a capacity for a unified civil-military interagency approach at the strategic, operational, and tactical level is a *sine qua non* for success in counterinsurgency. Part of the solution is better and stronger cross-embedded interagency command and liaison elements, down to at least the UEy/JTF level. Another more innovative solution is to genuinely mobilize the Department of State and USAID so they can develop off-the-shelf modular units of action that can be plugged in to CJTFs before they deploy. The Civil Operations and Rural Development System (CORDS) in Vietnam, while not at all flawless, offers some lessons and methods for interagency integration down to the grass roots level that are germane today. A CORDS-like USAID modular UA is conceivable and not infeasible. It would be a start toward remedying some of the problems that inhered in the CPA during OIF.

The Uptonian Paradox remains a US military cultural characteristic that is an impediment in prosecuting COIN, local or global. It is manifest in the predilection that has caused some in the military to believe in the primacy of the military sphere once the shooting starts. The paradox and its name stem from the fact that Emory Upton's influence on American military thought contributed to the following contradiction: The US Army has embraced Clausewitz as the quintessential oracle of war but it has also tended to eschew Clausewitz's overarching theme—the linkage of the military instrument to political purposes. In his writings, Upton strengthened the tendency to separate the civil and military spheres by advocating minimal civilian control to maximize military effectiveness. A similar phenomenon, with a Uptonian character, manifested itself after the Vietnam War under the rubric of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. After the nadir of the Vietnam War, the US military underwent an intellectual and professional renaissance that refocused it almost exclusively on the big-war paradigm and eschewed several studies that captured the true lessons of Vietnam. The Army embraced a book sponsored by the Army War College asserting that the US military failed in Vietnam, not because it was unable to adapt to counterinsurgency but because it did not fight that war conventionally enough. This cultural aversion to counterinsurgency and small wars was codified in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which essentially proscribed the use of force for anything other than conventional war.

Since unified civil-military-political effort is one *sine qua non* for success in COIN—military cultural preferences cannot and must not try to divorce the military from politics. What's more, success in counterinsurgency has never been the result of an exclusively military function. The history of counterinsurgency demonstrates that the fullest measure of integration of all government agencies under

unified control (and preferably unified command) is the only way to harmonize the elements of national power. A better solution is to cultivate an organizational culture where every agency of government involved in the counterinsurgency effort is cognizant of the primacy of information, the requirement to mold messages and images, and the salience of developing strategies, operations, and tactical plans focused on achieving the desired political and psychological effects.⁵⁰

With valid reasons, there are some historians who caution against generalizing too much from the counterinsurgencies of the 20th century and before. However, there are still valuable lessons to be distilled from those experiences and applied to the mutating and global nature of 21st-century insurgency. “The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.” The British, who have also had fairly extensive experiences with small wars and counterinsurgencies, have delineated six counterinsurgency principles: political primacy and political aim, coordinated government machinery, intelligence and information, separating the insurgent from his support, neutralizing the insurgent and longer-term postinsurgency planning. To these one may add another enduring lesson that the American military has learned over and over again, from the Indian wars, the Philippine Insurrection, the Banana Wars, Vietnam, to the present: The early and deliberate employment of indigenous forces in a counterinsurgent role can be a very effective method in helping achieve a successful outcome. General lessons from previous American counterinsurgency efforts are listed in the slideshow addendum to this article. The global counterinsurgency will be protracted, but the US military will prevail as it adapts and preserves current and previous counterinsurgency lessons and techniques in its organizational culture.⁵¹

Although he lived well over 100 years ago, George Crook epitomized the ultimate counterinsurgent leader because he was ruthless, resilient, adaptive, and fully knowledgeable about the enemy. As the result of his experience in California before the Civil War, Crook already knew much about the Indians and he learned much more. He studied them so fervently that one of his aides observed that Crook knew the Indian better than the Indian did. In war he was ruthless and resolute, and in peace he was considerate and humane in a paternalistic way. He insisted on honest treatment of the Indians and he never made a promise that he could not honor. Moreover, he consistently got on the trail, and he stayed on it until he found and cornered his enemy, despite all obstacles and hardships. He emphasized innovative techniques that were to become his trademark—extensive use of Indians to fight Indians and reliance on pack mules for field transportation. The use of Indians as counterinsurgents armed him with the Indian skill in guerrilla warfare and a psychological method that unhinged the enemy. The use of pack mules allowed him

mobility not possible with wagon trains. Counterinsurgent leaders of this era who emulate Crook are doing well against insurgents.⁵²

Notes

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50. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 8 November 2004), 29.

51. The British Army, *Army Field Manual, Volume V, Operations Other Than War* (London: Chief of the General Staff, 1995), 3-1 and 3-2. For a concise survey of some valuable American military lessons in effective counterinsurgency methods, see Robert M. Cassidy, "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars," *Parameters* (Summer 2004): 73-83.

52. Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1890* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 185.

Cassidy Slide Addendum: Lessons From Past Counterinsurgencies

UNCLASSIFIED **Relevant Lessons: from Vietnam and from Counterinsurgencies Pre-dating Vietnam**

- ✓ **Army History of Successful Counterinsurgencies During Indian Campaigns and in the Philippines**
- ✓ **USMC Small Wars in Central and South America**
- ✓ **USMC Limited Success with Combined Action Platoons early in Vietnam War**
- ✓ **A Better War–Abrams Era Limited Successes with Vietnamization, CORDS, and Pacification**
- ✓ **Host of Works Documenting Operational and Tactical Lessons from Vietnam**
- ✓ **PROBLEM: The Army as an Institution did not Learn from its Experience in Vietnam**

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Figure 1

UNCLASSIFIED **Indian Campaigns Lessons**

- ✓ **Miles-Coerce Population Relocation Via Resource Denial**
- ✓ **Crook–Insert Small Teams of Enemy Tribes into Apache Insurgents' Sanctuaries to Induce Fear and Sap Will**
- ✓ **Redress Indian Grievances, Treat Prisoners Well, Avoid Killing Women and Children**
- ✓ **Legacy of Loose Body of Principles:**
 - **Close Civil-Military Coordination of Pacification**
 - **Firm but Fair Paternalistic Government**
 - **Economic and Educational Reforms**

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Figure 2

UNCLASSIFIED

Lessons from the Philippines

- ✓ **Search and Destroy was Counterproductive**
- ✓ **Enhance Perceived Regime Legitimacy Instead of use of Excessive Military Force**
- ✓ **Mobilize Popular Support Among Agrarian Elite and New Commercial Class**
- ✓ **Patrolling Emphasized Presence Over Search and Destroy and Cordon and Search**
- ✓ **Use of Indigenous Forces to Divide and Conquer—Macabebes, Philippine Scouts, Paramilitary Police, and Philippine Constabulary**
- ✓ **Allowed Creation of Pro- and Anti-American Political Parties to Encourage Insurgents to Vote, Not Fight**

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Figure 3

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Banana Wars -- Small Wars Manual

- ✓ **Employ Native Troops, Supported by Marines, as Early as Possible to Assume Responsibility for Security**
- ✓ **Motive is Social, Economic, and Political Development of the People, Not Material Destruction**
- ✓ **The Goal is to Gain Results with the Least Application of Force and the Consequent Minimum Loss of Life**
- ✓ **Keys are Active Patrolling, Psychological Operations, Garrisoning Specific Locations, Guaranteeing the Security of the Local Population, and Denying Sanctuary to Insurgents**

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Figure 4

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Strategic Lessons of Vietnam

- ✓ **Focus on War of Big Battalions and the Primacy of Combat Operations Assured that Pacification was 2nd.**
- ✓ **Did Not Understand the Nature of the Conflict–Tried to Turn Guerrilla War into Something it was Not.**
- ✓ **Did not Understand the Enemy, Did not Know Allies, Ignored Geopolitical Aspects of Security Environment.**
- ✓ **No Appreciation of the Centrality of Moral Legitimacy in Supporting the Counterinsurgency Effort. VC conducted Prolonged and Indirect War Against Legitimacy of GVN.**
- ✓ **Primarily Sought Military Solution to a Primarily Political, Ideological, and Administrative Problem.**

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Figure 5

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**Operational Lessons of Vietnam:
Efforts That Achieved Some Success**

Combined Action Platoons (USMC):

- ✓ **Village Pacification which coupled Marine Squads and Indigenous Platoons to Jointly Secure Local Area**
- ✓ **Exponential Increase in Number of Forces Available for Local Security Patrols**
- ✓ **Commensurate Increase in Intelligence Resulting from Presence and Saturation Patrolling**
- ✓ **Tasks: Destroy VCI, Secure Population, Organize People's Intelligence Nets, Civic Action and Propaganda**

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Figure 6

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**Operational Lessons of Vietnam:
Efforts That Achieved Some Success**

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support:

- ✓ **Created by Johnson Administration and Integrated with the Military Effort Under MACV in 1967**
- ✓ **Met with Some Success During Abrams' Era Because of Civil and Military Leadership's Emphasis on Pacification**
- ✓ **Concomitant Efforts to Vietnamize-Improve and Expand RVN, TF, PSDF—Helped Secure the Population**
- ✓ **Accelerated Pacification Campaign (Phoenix)—PRUs Spearhead CORDS/CIA Effort to Expunge VCI**

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Figure 7

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**Operational Lessons of Vietnam:
Things That Did Not Work**

- ✓ **Allied Forces Never Organized into Single Combined and Unified Command**
- ✓ **CORDS and CAP Never Integrated or Harmonized**
- ✓ **Big Unit Search and Destroy-Attritional Approach**
- ✓ **Two-War Approach—Focus on Destroying NVA and VC Main Forces while Marginalizing COIN**
- ✓ **Command/Individual Rotation Policy—Disruptive and Not Conducive to Capturing/Institutionalizing Lessons**

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Figure 8

Lessons from El Salvador

- ✓ **Regime Legitimacy and Popular Support Improved by Professionalizing the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF)**
- ✓ **Congressionally Imposed Limit of 55 Advisers in Military Group Precluded Conventionalizing/Americanizing the War**
- ✓ **Civilian Controlled and Professionalized ESAF Exhibited Restraint in the Use of Force and Observance of Basic Human Rights**
- ✓ **USAID Driven/Funded Economic Support = Popular Support**
- ✓ **Government and ESAF Redress Massive Social Inequities**
- ✓ **Co-opted Insurgents (FMLN) into Political Process by Allowing them to Create a Political Party and to Vote**
- ✓ **General Galvin (CINCSOUTH) Adopted an Approach Modeled after the Vietnam Era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)**

Figure 9

Iraq Revisited

Jay M. Garner

I'd like to discuss some things that I think need to happen over in Iraq for us to be successful. Then, I'd like to give you my lessons learned. After that, I'll answer any questions that you want to ask.

Let's talk very quickly about postwar Iraq and what was going on there in the years before the invasion. There are a couple of significant things. Iraq is a fairly rich agricultural country along the Fertile Crescent of the Tigris and Euphrates. And the crop production up north had gone from almost 4 million hectares under Saddam Hussein, down to about 1.8 million hectares. It had been cut in half. In the area of health, Hussein's government spent less than 90 cents per person per year on health care. 90 cents a year, per person. 22 percent of the children in Iraq suffered from malnutrition.

The electrical grids in Iraq were only capable of producing 50 percent of the electricity that the country needed—at its maximum production. In the education system there was only one book per six students. The country was only capable of producing 60 percent of the potable water that it needed. In Baghdad alone, the residents of Baghdad dumped 500 metric tons of sewage into the Tigris River every day, which went south to all the towns and cities down south for them to use as cooking water, drinking water, washing water, and that type of thing. And finally, the infant mortality rate in prewar Iraq is the highest in the Middle East. That's five times higher than Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia has a fairly high infant mortality rate.

Like Gordon [Rudd] said, I was in a restaurant in New York toward the end of January. I got a call from Rumsfeld's office saying, "We'd like to talk to you. We want to talk to you about doing something in postwar Iraq." So, I went to see them. And Secretary of Defense [Donald] Rumsfeld said, "[General] Tommy Franks [Commander, US Central Command] and I really want you to do this." I was the president of a company, and I had 2,000 people that worked for me. I said, "You know, first of all, I've got to go see if I can get a leave of absence from my company. Number two, I've got to go to the wife I've been married to for 44 years and see if she'll let me do this."

And the president signed a decision memorandum creating the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs on 20 January 2003. I went to work for Rumsfeld around 27 January and spent from 1 February until 15 March in the Pentagon. During that time, we formed an interagency team with quite a bit of military on it. We brought military in there to do what we call "expeditionary staff work." Really,

we'd have never been able to accomplish anything if we hadn't had military people in there that know how to get gasoline, know how to get rations, know how to move you from Point A to Point B, and all those type of things.

By 16 March, we had close to 300 people. We'd grown from one person to 300 people in about six weeks, and we deployed to Kuwait. From 16 March to 21 April, we stayed in Kuwait. On 27 March, we took a team of about 40 people, and we put them in Basrah to begin working postwar efforts in the south. We actually collocated them with the British. On 7 April, we took another team of similar size and put them up in Erbil to begin working postwar issues in northern Iraq.

Around 10 April, LTG Dave McKiernan made the decision to disband Task Force IV. So, he let me cherry-pick Task Force IV. Task Force IV had some outstanding colonels on it, some great colonels. So, I cherry-picked all the good colonels. That was a windfall for me, because they became invaluable over the next two or three months.

On 14 April, I went to Nasiriyah, and the following day we held the first meeting ever held in Iraq to discuss democracy in Iraq. We held it at the site of the ancient city of Ur, where many people say civilization began. I thought that day, what an incredible experience to be at the point where civilization began, and also now, for the first time, to be with the Iraqis talking at this place where democracy in Iraq can begin. We had about 300 Iraqis there—none from Baghdad, because the fighting was still going on in Baghdad. We had Iraqis from the north, the south, and about 125 from the US and from Britain and other places in Europe. It was an interesting day. I was taken back by how much the Iraqis—I'm not talking about the expatriates now, I'm talking about the 150 that were there from Iraq—I was taken back about how much they had thought about democracy and the form of government and how you do that, and that type of thing. So, that was a good day. It was a very emotional day for the Iraqis.

On 21 April, I went to Baghdad to do three things: number one, to make an assessment of the hospital system, because I was convinced that we would have an outbreak of epidemics; number two, to look at the electrical grid system, because if we're going to stabilize things, especially like hospital medical care, that type of thing, you've got to have electricity; and the third thing, to look at the sewage system there, to see how backed up it was because I was afraid we were going to get, like I said, an epidemic there. My chief of staff was Jerry Bates, some of you might know him. He's a retired 3-star general. He commanded the Second Armored Division several years ago. By that time, we'd grown to almost 400 people. Jerry Bates got all of them lined up, got them chalked up, and began the road march from Kuwait City to Baghdad. He started that on the morning of 23 April, in about 150

Suburbans.

On the 22nd, I went up to northern Iraq. The reason I did that was that I'd been told by several people that [Jalal] Talabani and [Masoud] Barzani—the two Kurdish leaders, Talabani, the PUK [Popular Union of Kurdistan], and Barzani, the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party]—were going to come to Baghdad and form a government. I didn't want them to do that. I know Talabani and Barzani very well. We went through an awful lot together in 1991. I like both of them; I've maintained a fairly close relationship with both of them, and friendship with both of them.

So, on the 22nd, I met them in Erbil, and then we all went to As Sulaymaniyah together and sat down in As Sulaymaniyah. And I asked if they were going to try to form a government, and they said, "What we were going to do is put together a leadership group that you could use so that there's a face of leadership for the Iraqi people." They said, "If you don't do that, then you're going to look like an occupying force." I said, "Alright, who do you propose be in this?" They said, "Well, the two of us," Talabani and Barzani, plus [Ahmed] Chalabi, because he was the darling of the administration, Pachichi, Allawi, Hakim, and they said two others. "What we want to do," they said, "is take two others out of Iraq, not expatriates—we want a Christian and probably Jafari who is a Dawa. I can't remember their names now. And I said, "The only problem I got with that is Hakim." Now Hakim is very fundamentalist. His uncle stayed in Iran, and his uncle got killed last year in 2003. A very fundamentalist cleric. Talabani said, "Look Jay, it's better to have Hakim inside the tent than outside the tent." I said, "Well, that's probably pretty good advice. What I want you to do, then, you put this group together. I want you to be in Baghdad in five days. I'll use you as a leadership group, as an Iraqi face for the Iraqi people. And I want you to have the communications necessary to talk to me every day."

Larry Dirita called [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz that night to inform them about our plan and I called John Abizaid to arrange safe passage for the Kurds to travel to Baghdad. So, they did that. They all came to Baghdad. All seven of them came there. They took their deputies and formed a deputies committee and put it in the hotel downtown. They met 8 to 10 hours a day and had direct communication with me. I wrote several things for them to put out over the airwaves or put in the newspapers. That worked pretty well, I think, although the problem with that whole process was that it was difficult for the Iraqi population to identify with any one of these leaders. See, you had some Kurds on there, some expatriates that the Iraqi people don't care about at all—Chalabi, Allawi, Pachichi, and those guys. Then you got a couple of people in there, Hakim for one, who's very fundamentalist. So, it was kind of hard for the Iraqis to identify with any one person in that group. That's why we tried to make it sort of a mosaic.

On the 22nd, we held the second conference for Iraqis to get together and discuss democracy. President Bush sent over an envoy, Zal Khalilzad. (He's a good guy. He's now the envoy in Afghanistan.) That was kind of an interesting day because the Baathists attempted to dominate the proceedings, and the rest of the Iraqis there wouldn't allow them to do that. I thought that was a pretty good sign.

When Jerry Bates arrived with the 300 plus people we had on 24 April, the environment there was not permissive. The UN was not there because they wouldn't allow anybody to come in because it was a non-permissive environment. There were no contractors in there. The Bechtel/Halliburton bunch wasn't in there. We only had the KBR guys that came with us out of Kuwait. The State Department Disaster Assistance Relief teams refused to come into Baghdad because it wasn't permissive.

On 17 April, I flew to Doha to see Tommy Franks, and I said, "You've got to get me and my team into Baghdad, into Iraq." He said, "Jay, it's too damn dangerous right now. The worst thing that could happen is we get a bunch of civilians killed going in there." I said, "Yeah, but there's too many vacuums that are filling up right now with things that you and I don't want them to fill it up with. So, you've got to do that." Now, Tommy Franks' plan was that we would go into Phase IV in about anywhere from 30 to 90 days after combat operations, then we would take our whole team and put it in there. I said, "You know, that plan doesn't work anymore." He said, "Well, you're probably right. Let me call Dave McKiernan, and I'll see what we can do to provide you with security." So, that was on the 17th. On the 18th he called me back. He said, "Jay, you're free to go. God bless you, and Dave and I will give you everything we can possibly give you, but you know we still got a fight on our hands." I said, "I know that and I appreciate it." Then we road marched into Baghdad.

I had a real good team, I thought. When we first started putting together this team, I told Rumsfeld, "You know what you're going to get out of this interagency team. You're going to get a C team. You're going to get every guy or gal that interagency wanted to unload." Well, that wasn't true. I got extremely good people. I had four retired ambassadors, three of whom were fantastic. And I had four active ambassadors. One of them was Margaret Tutwiler, who was ambassador to Morocco at the time. She was the PAO [Public Affairs Officer] during the [George H.W.] Bush administration, and she came to be my PAO. Then, I had five retired generals—Jerry Bates, Buck Walters, Bruce Moore, Ron Adams, and myself. I thought we all worked well together, and everybody is kind of one team, one fight. On that team, you didn't get any of the [bureaucratic] warfare that was going on outside that team between the State Department and the Department of Defense. Rumsfeld said, "Look, here's what I want you to do. Form this organization from the interagency.

There's been an immense amount of planning." And there had been. You read that there was no plan; there were tons of plans. He said, "There's been an immense amount of planning. What we need to do, number one, is operationalize these plans." And he said, "Number two, the plans have all been done in the vertical stovepipe of the agency or department they're in, so we need to horizontally connect them." So, that's what we tried to do for the next two months.

But, what we really focused on during the time we were in the Pentagon and in Kuwait was oil field fires, because Saddam had done that in the first Gulf War. Also, we were concerned about large numbers of refugees and displaced people because we thought there was a high probability that he would gas both the Kurds and the Shia. You know, he'd done it in previous years before, and he'd do that to create a massive problem for us as we entered Iraq. We were also concerned that there would be a food shortage that could lead to famine. The Oil for Food program had ceased in January, so we were afraid that, number one, many of them had sold the food, and, number two, the rest had consumed it. So, there would be a vast food shortage. The problem with the Oil for Food program was that it was managed by the UN to sell the oil and purchase the food, but, once the food arrived in Iraq, it was an Iraqi distribution system with about 44,000 nodes in it. We were afraid that, as a function of the war, that whole distribution system had been disrupted. So, we feared there would be a famine. And then, the last thing was epidemics. You know, there's a high incidence of cholera in Iraq in the summertime. So, we were really worried about epidemics.

What we found when we got in there was that none of those things happened. And I think you can credit the military operation for that. I sure as hell think Saddam would have set the oil fields afire. In fact, when the 173d and the Special Operations guys got up north, and when the Brits got in the south, they found charges on several of the rigs. So, I think the intent was to set them on fire. The refugees and IDPs (Internally Displaced People)—I really thought he'd create that problem for us. I think what happened is, that first day, as you know, Tommy Franks went after him, and I think General Franks rang his bell that first day, and he took away all his military communications.

The food shortage, there wasn't one. They hadn't sold the food. They hadn't consumed all of it, and the distribution system was intact. So, we began immediately—about three weeks in there—delivering food again.

And, then, we stopped epidemics. We did that through a concentrated effort to hire Iraqis to pick up garbage, and we provided potable water. In fact, at the end of the first week, we were in Baghdad, and we had hundreds of Iraqis hired picking up garbage. So, we were able to avert all that.

What we found is, we needed to go into immediate reconstruction. That was an incredible problem because we don't do postwar stuff in the military or in the government. We hire to have it done. We don't have an organization to do postwar things. We might put one together to plan things, but when it comes to execution, we hire contractors to do that. What had happened was, the money wasn't available until late—until after the war started—to hire the contractors. Then, once you hire them, they've got to go out and get the team, the team has to be formed, they have to identify what their workload is, and then they've got to go through the CENTCOM requirements to do all the things they have to do to be allowed to come into the country. So, that's a long process. We did not begin to get large numbers of contractors there until June. So, this was April, and we were there and had a lot of things to do. So, that was the first problem.

The second problem was the electrical grids. Like I told you, the existing grids only had the capacity to serve about half the country. But, the electrical grids in northern and southern Iraq are damn good. They are capable of providing electricity to the people. But what Saddam Hussein had done for years was to tap off the electricity from the northern and southern grids and pull it into Baghdad, so the Baathists and the military—everybody except the people in Saddam City—could have it almost 24/7, while the people in the north and south only got electricity for a few hours a day. When we got there, we all knew that there was not the capacity to provide electricity to the whole country, but we didn't realize what bad shape the electrical grids were in. In fact, the entire infrastructure was horrible. You've read about it, and it was terrible.

We took Brigadier General Steve Hawkins, who had been the commander of Task Force IV, and we had him form an engineering organization that had a lot of LTG Dave McKiernan's tactical engineers, a lot of engineers from the Corps of Engineers, Jordanian engineers, a few Kuwaiti engineers, and a lot of Iraqi engineers. By just sheer workload and skill, they put most of the electrical stuff back together, where you could again begin to produce about 50 percent per day. But, that created an interesting dilemma. I was down in Al Hila, near the ancient city of Babylon. The governor down there had a big electrical grid near there, and he said, "You know, we really appreciate you all liberating us and getting rid of Saddam Hussein." I said, "Well, the ball's in your court now. You have to make something out of this." He said, "We will. We like this democracy. For instance, we're not sending any more electricity to Baghdad. This is ours. We're going to keep it all down here for us." I thought, "Yeah, this is a double-edged sword here, because you've got to pump some into Baghdad." But we had huge electrical grid problems. Still have those today.

Our plan was to immediately bring back the public service in 20 of the 23

ministries. We weren't going to use the Ministry of Propaganda, the Ministry of Intelligence, that type of thing. But the rest of them—Health, Education, Police, Agriculture, etcetera—we were going to bring all those back. We were going to bring them back immediately and start the Public Works function to get the country functioning again. What happened was that only one or two government buildings were destroyed by warfare, but as a result of looting, 17 of the 20 buildings we were going to use were destroyed. They were not structurally sound. There were no excess buildings in Baghdad. Since there were no buildings there, none of the public servants showed up.

So, I had to take this team of mine and put them on the streets of Baghdad, walking around saying, “Do you know anybody that was in the Ministry of Agriculture? Do you know anybody that was in the Ministry of Education, etcetera?” Over the first week, they put together the nucleus for those 20 ministries. They got people to come back. As they got enough to come back, in every instance the “little old lady in tennis shoes” came up with the disk that she had pulled before the war, and that gave us the roster of who was in that ministry. With that roster, we could then begin to put out that we could pay them. That's one of the ways we got them back was to start paying them.

Once we got them back, we had a huge problem of where do they meet? And, how do we put them together? The second problem we had with the ministries was there was no civilian telecommunications center. Remember that when 3d ID entered Baghdad, Baghdad Bob was on the radio saying, “There's no one here. They're not even across our borders yet.” Well, finally, CentCom took out his ability to do that. And, in doing that, they took out the telecommunications system, so that there was literally no way to communicate on the civilian side in Iraq, except up north where the Kurds had a very good system. But from Tikrit south, there was no way to communicate. So, just to start the schools, we had to bring the public servants in from the countryside, put them in the Republican Palace, and spend that day telling them when school would start, when they would graduate, when we would pay all the teachers, etcetera, and then send them back out to do that. And you couldn't change your mind, because you'd have to call them all back in together again.

The next problem I had was with the people who were appointed to run the ministries. And I'm talking about the people off my team that were going to oversee the ministries. I'll save that for just a minute, because that's kind of a unique story, and I'll cover that with you in just another minute or two.

Our initial concept was to do what I call “gentle de-Baathification.” I did not have a de-Baathification policy, and we had asked the Administration for that.

Rumsfeld asked me two or three days before I left, he said, “What are you going to do for de-Baathification?” I said, “Well, first of all, the Administration is supposed to give me a policy.” He said, “Well, we don’t have that right now, so what do you think?” I said, “I think there are two scenarios. The first scenario is that, in several places, when we get there the Baathists won’t be there anymore, because the people will have killed them.” That’s what happened in the north in 1991: as soon as the Kurds took over, they killed everybody in government. I said, “The second scenario is we bring them all back to work, and, over time, the people will start pointing out the bad guys. And as they point out the bad guys, we’ll vet them, and we’ll take them out.” I said, “What we won’t do, we won’t bring back the number one guy and we won’t bring back the personnel guy. We know they’re both bad.” He said, “Well, that sounds fine with me until we get you a policy.” So, we had what I call gentle de-Baathification, which was highly unpopular with Ahmed Chalabi and others in the administration.

The second thing was to immediately bring back the Iraqi army. We had budgeted for that. We had budgeted to pay 2 million public servants, about 300,000 soldiers, and about 12,000 police, to bring them back. What we had was \$1.6 billion that the President released to us that were the frozen assets from the first Gulf War. It was Iraqi money—it wasn’t appropriated money; it was Iraqi money. So, our plan was to bring the Iraqi army back.

DoD let a contract, and they hired MPRI (Military Professional Resources, Incorporated). Some of you may know MPRI. MPRI trained the Croatian Army. They did a damn good job of it. They train armies around the world. So, I had an entire contracted training team from MPRI led by Paul Cerjan, a retired Army 3-star, that was going to bring back the Iraqi army and train them. John Abizaid beat on me every day to hurry up and get the army back. The problem we had is the army didn’t give up like it did in the first Gulf War. I thought, going in, that we’d have 100,000 to 150,000 prisoners, and we’d just take them all out and say, “Let us sign you back up.” A bunch of them would sign up, and we’d go to work with them. That didn’t happen. They took off their uniforms and they just kind of evaporated. So, it took us the first month we were there to begin to round them up. By the end of the first week in May, we had thousands of them showing up, wanting to come back. We were getting ready to bring them back when the decision was made not to do that, which caught me by surprise.

The third plan we had was to have a face of leadership for the Iraqi people, and I’ve already talked about that—that was the seven Iraqis that we brought together. Then we came up with nine rapid and immediate priorities that we needed to accomplish for stability. The first one was to get the ministries back to a functioning level countrywide. The second was to pay salaries, nationwide—that’s salaries to

all the public servants, the police, and the army. Number three was to restore the police, the court and prison systems. Number four was to restore basic services to Baghdad. We were getting the hell beat out of us in Baghdad because the reporters didn't have any air conditioning. Number five was to end the fuel crisis. I don't know if you remember that, but there was no fuel. All cooking in Iraq is done with propane, so we had to bring propane in. Plus, there wasn't the gas to move vehicles around, trucks around. So, McKiernan, every day, brought in tankers to provide fuel to the Iraqi population. That's amazing. A country that produces 2.5 million barrels of oil a day is out of fuel. The sixth thing was to purchase the harvest. Now, the wheat was ready to harvest—the wheat, barley, and other things. So we needed to purchase all that and to also re-establish the food distribution system. We needed to install interim town councils in every city of 100,000 or more. That's 26 cities. And then, we needed to meet the public health needs and avoid epidemics. And, by and large, we accomplished most of those priorities.

Now, my problem. . . my specific set of problems was, number one, the infighting before I left between DoD and the State Department. The warfare between Rumsfeld and Powell permeated everything we did. Well, I fault Rumsfeld and Powell for that. I mean, they're big guys; they should not operate that way. But, really, I fault Condoleeza Rice for that. I like her. I mean, she's a great lady. But her job is to get the two of them and say, "Hey, if you can't get along, then we're going to meet in the President's office before the sun sets in Washington," And to my knowledge she didn't do that.

The next problem I had was money—the \$1.6 billion dollars plus the money that the Congress was appropriating. Over at OMB (Office of Management and Budget), I had this woman named Robin Cleveland who decided she hated me and everybody else at ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance), and made several statements that "I'm going to make this impossible for them. In fact, I'm going to make them fail." In order to spend Iraqi money, I had to drag each dollar bill across the table, one at a time. I had to go through more to spend Iraqi money than you have to go through to spend appropriated money. It was almost impossible to get money. In fact, I ended up calling back to the Pentagon saying, "This is going to fail if I can't have this much money." That was ridiculous.

Now, I told you I'd talk about the ministries. This is an interesting story. The first week I was on the job, I drew up the organization. There were four pillars: one reconstruction, one humanitarian affairs, one civil administration, and the fourth one, the expeditionary staff to support everything. I sat down with Ron Adams and a couple of other people, and we said, "What function does every one of those pillars have to do?" And, based on those functions, we tasked the interagency for people. The interagency was great. I got everything I ever asked them for. So, out

of that, for example, we said, “We ought to get the guy that oversees Agriculture to come out of the Department of Agriculture.” And as we went through each ministry, we got good people to oversee things.

Well, the day before I left for Kuwait—we left for Kuwait on Sunday, 16 March—on the 15th, Rumsfeld calls me and says, “I want you to come see me.” So, I went over the morning of the 15th; it was just him and me in the office. He said, “Jay, really I haven’t focused on this enough, and I apologize to you because I’ve been so wrapped up in the war. But I’m looking at this organization now, and I just can’t agree with it.” I said, “I’m leaving tomorrow.” He said, “Well, it’s these people you got running ministries. I don’t think many of them are qualified, and I think DoD ought to run all these ministries.” I said, “Who are you going to have run Agriculture?” I went through the ministries. He said, “Well, we’ll find somebody.” I said, “This team is fine. It’s too late to change.” He said, “Well, I want you to think about this, and on the plane over, you reconsider all this and then call me as soon as you get to Kuwait. I’m going to put together a good team for you.” I said, “We’ve missed the window. It’s too late. I’m leaving tomorrow. We can’t raise people that fast.” He said to just call him. So, I land, I call him. I said that I still had my position, I didn’t agree with his. He said, “Well, I’m going to put together a good team for you. Don’t worry about it.” Now, I had never told this to any of the people that were overseeing the ministries. The only other person who knew this was Ron Adams.

So, in the first week of April, I get a call from Ryan Henry in Doug Feith’s shop. They said, “Hey, Rumsfeld now has the list of the people who are going to run the ministries for you. It’s a great team. Let me give you the names.” So, I write all of them down. I said, “When are they going to get here?” They said, “Well, we don’t know. It might take a long time for some of them.” I said, “You know, we’re going into Iraq in another week.” He said, “We’ll do this as fast as we can.” Two days later, on the 14th, just before I went to Nasiriyah, I get a call from Doug Feith’s office. They said, “There’s a little glitch on these people running ministries.” I said, “What is it?” They said, “Well, the White House found out we were doing that, and they don’t want us to select them, they want to select them. So, we have to go back to the drawing board because the White House wants to select everybody.” To make a long story short, those people that were to oversee ministries didn’t get there until June. Some didn’t get there until July, and some didn’t get there until August. But, the people we had selected early on, back when we were in the Pentagon, really did the job of overseeing the ministries and getting them started. And they did a damn good job.

We were very silent about this organization, ORHA. Even though the Administration had signed a Presidential Decision Memorandum, it didn’t want to talk

about this organization that I was the director of. And the reason for that—it would have been an admission that we were going to war—that we’ve got a postwar organization. But two days before we left for Kuwait, I told my PAO (Public Affairs Officer) guy, we’ve got to have a press conference. When we show up over there, everybody’s going to say, “What the hell is this?” So, we had a press conference in the Pentagon. And Jerry Bates and I conducted that press conference. I got one question in there about what was my involvement with INC? (The INC is the Iraqi National Congress, run by Ahmed Chalabi.) I said, “I don’t have any involvement with them.” They said, “Well, what’s your relationship with Ahmed Chalabi?” I said, “I don’t have a relationship with Ahmed Chalabi.” I said, “I don’t have a candidate. We’re going to get over there, we’re going to sort things out, and we’ll do the right things. None of us are going over there with a candidate.” That night, I got phone calls from Feith. He said that I had degraded Ahmed and the INC. I said, “Look, that’s not my problem. If you don’t like that, go get another guy. I don’t have a candidate. By the way, Rumsfeld doesn’t have one either. I’ve heard him say that several times.” So, they embargoed me from speaking to the press.

So, I get to Kuwait, and I’m embargoed from talking to the press. I’m there about two weeks, and the press is madder than hell at me. You can understand that. And they’re staying out in the Hilton Villa with me. So, I called Rumsfeld and I said, “Look, this is madness.” He said, “What?” I said, “That you got me embargoed from the press.” He said, “I don’t have you embargoed from the press. Go talk to them. Talk to anybody you need to talk to. Just be discreet.” And I said, “OK, great.” So, I told Margaret Tutwiler, who’s a great lady, I said, “Hey, I’m unembargoed, let’s talk to the press.” Forty-five minutes later, she came back and said, “Well, you know, we had a good 45 minutes, but you’re embargoed again.” I said, “By who?” She said, “The White House embargoed you.” So, the entire time I was in Kuwait, I was not allowed to talk to the press. So, what Margaret did—she said, “We’ve got to be careful with this, so what I’m going to do is, each night, when you come back from dinner, I’m going to get you ambushed by somebody from the press. One night it might be BBC, the next night it might be CNN. The next night, it might be CBS. I’ll hand pick them, and I’ll let them ambush you. Then I’ll shut it off after about 7 or 8 minutes.” So that’s the only way we were able to get things out to the press until we got into Baghdad.

Telecommunications. No telecommunications on the civil side. I talked about that. I talked about the ministry buildings—17 of the 20 buildings we were going to use were destroyed by looting. Looting is an interesting subject. Looting was over by the time I got there on the 21st. I get a lot of questions about whether we should have done more about looting. I’ll tell you my position on that. I talked to a lot of soldiers in the 3d ID about looting—a lot of sergeants and a lot of company-grade officers. What I pieced together from that is, in many cases the looting was

occurring on a street before the force got there. So, when they got there, the building was already on fire. Number two, in many cases, the looting was occurring while our troops were still having some combat operations, and they were more interested in taking cover than in trying to stop looting.

To me, looting is like a riot control operation. If you're going to stop it, you've got to show your presence and be very physical. You have to stand up, you have to use loud speakers, etcetera. But if you're in the middle of combat operations and do that, you're a target. So, those are two incompatible scenarios. The third one: you've got a kid in the 3d ID that's been fighting for the last 17 or 18 days, and he's not going to shoot some women walking off with a chair or some kid carrying off a TV. It's just not our culture to do that. I don't know how we control looting in the future. That is a problem. I think it's unfair to criticize CFLCC, McKiernan's forces, for not controlling the looting. My opinion is, in most cases, they couldn't have done a damn thing about it.

Next thing is, we had insufficient security to protect us. I'm talking about ORHA, the 350 people we have now. You've got three types of security. You've got personal security for the leaders of the organization. If they're moving around, you give them a few bodyguards. We contracted that. We contracted South Africans. They're meaner than hell, they were great at it. Then you've got physical security around the palace. We contracted that. We got Gurkhas. They're great. They're also meaner than hell and they have long knives. They're great at that.

But, then we had to move around. Every day, I had to have a minimum of 27 elements move around—20 to go to the ministries, and seven to do other things. And, I moved around all day long. So, every day, McKiernan and Fuzzy Webster had to produce for me at least 58 gun vehicles, because, by the CENTCOM rule, you could not move around without a gun vehicle in front and a gun vehicle in back, and armed personnel inside your vehicle. So, McKiernan did his best. He stopped a lot of things he was doing to support me. I'll tell you, the first day I was in Kuwait, McKiernan wrapped his arms around Jerry Bates and me, had a staff meeting, and said we were all one team.

So, the relationship ... my personal relationship with CFLCC, I thought, was great, and I thought they busted their asses to support us. But, he simply did not have the force to give us the daily security that we needed. The third day I was there, I was talking to [Lieutenant General] Scott Wallace, [the V Corps commander]. And that day, the third day I was in Baghdad, that was the 24th of April, that day he had 276 static sites that he had to guard, that didn't have a thing to do with the combat operations going on, trying to seal the border, that type thing. So, the force was just not sufficient to do what it had to do. You can go back in time

and say, [General Eric] Shinseki, was right. You know, they beat up Shinseki, but he was right.

Then there were three bad decisions made on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May. I'll tell you what they were and how they evolved. I don't fault Jerry Bremer for this. Don't think I'm taking a shot at Jerry Bremer, because I'm not. But, when he came over, I brought him into Baghdad on 11 May. I went and picked him up at Doha, flew him into Basrah, took him around Basrah, then brought him into Baghdad. On the 13th, he pulled out of his briefcase the de-Baathification policy. I read it, and thought it went to deep. It went down about five or six levels. I mean, you think about going down that far in our government and removing everybody. How efficient do you think the remaining government would be? Not very efficient. So, I got the CIA guy. He read it, and he said, "We can't do this." I said, "Well, let's go talk to Bremer." So, I went in there and said, "Jerry, this is too harsh. Give me about an hour, hour and a half, and we will sit down and do the puts and takes on this, and we'll get Rumsfeld on the phone, and we'll try to soften it." He said, "No, I have my instructions and I'm going to issue this." So, he issued the policy.

So, that's the first tragic mistake, going that deep with de-Baathification and making that many enemies. As you know Sun-tzu says not to end up the day with more enemies than you started with that morning. Again, I'm not criticizing Jerry Bremmer. I believe that he was given some very firm instructions to execute, which unfortunately later turned out to be mistakes.

The next tragic mistake was the decision to not bring back the Iraqi army and to disband the Ministry of Defense. That shocked me, because up until the day before I went to pick-up Bremer, we were still doing VTCs (video teleconferences) with the Pentagon on how we were bringing back the Iraqi army. I think Walt Slocum gave birth to the idea of disbanding the Iraqi army and sold it. That was a tragic decision because, when we did that—we told somewhere between 250,000 and 350,000 Iraqi soldiers—I'm talking about the regular army now, not the Republican Guards or the Special Republican Guards—but we told somewhere between 250,000 and 350,000 Iraqi soldiers, "You don't have a job." Now, they're still armed. They just took their uniforms off, hid their weapons, and put on civilian clothes.

Then, on Friday, they brought in the Iraqi leadership group we had put together and they were told, "We're the government here. You're not going to be the government. Go home." And they went home that Saturday morning. So, on Saturday morning when we woke up, we had somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000 enemies we didn't have on Wednesday morning, and we had no Iraqi face of leadership to explain things to the Iraqi people. We began to pay significantly for those

decisions. What happened, as you saw, months later the CPA began to try to rectify that. The first thing that happened, in the end of July, first of August, they put in the Committee of 25—they brought that back in order to have an Iraqi face in leadership. Then, later on, they started a very slow, but measured process to bring back elements of the army. And finally, a few months ago, they started bringing back some of the Baathists that they had de-Baathified.

Having said all that, I'm convinced in my heart of hearts that there's still a chance over there to have a stable, economically viable, democratic confederation. And I want to underline the word *confederation*, because I'm going to explain to you what I mean by that. But in order to do that, we have to have a national strategy. I'm going to tell you, there's no strategy for Iraq. There was never one when I was there, and I haven't seen one since I left. But, we have to have one. I'll tell you what I think ought to go into it. The first thing is an understanding that we, as Westerners, look at things through Western eyes. You cannot do that in the Middle East. You can't do it anywhere else in the world. What we fail to realize is that we in America, with our wonderful democratic government, can't take that government as a template and slap it on another country. You can't do that in Latin America, you can't do it in Africa, and you can't do it in the Middle East. What happened to us in the West was a long, evolving process involving all the Western nations. You get it through two things—through technology and through capital investment. As you begin to have technological breakthroughs and you begin to have capital investment and create revenue, you've got to have a workforce. And you've got to keep that workforce happy. That results in a very complex process that leads governments to be secular, to be pluralistic, and to have toleration.

There's another thing that happened in the West somewhere between 100 and 150 years ago. Sometime in that period, Westerners quit looking to the past. There's not a Westerner you can find that gives a damn about the past. Do you think Americans care about the past? Go out on any street in America and ask the first 12 people, "Tell me about the past." And they would talk about the ball game on Friday night or the vacation they had two weeks ago. No one in the West is wedded to the past. That is not true in the Middle East. That's because we got comfortable, and we became confident in our government. So, we look to the future. All Westerners are futuristic.

As this government process goes on, the workers who are producing the revenue, the GDP, they begin to demand more of a share of the decisions of government. So, government has to release more decisions to the people. So then you begin to get the formation of a real democratic state. So, the modern democratic spirit that we have in this country, and you have in Western countries, is fundamentally different from anywhere else. The process we have took over 200 years to

get where we are right now. You couldn't have taken our form of democracy today and, in 1781, gone to the former Colonies and said, "This is going to be your government," they would have revolted again. Let me ask you a question. How would you have liked to have been in a democratic America in 1900? No women's rights, no unions, no real rights. How would you have liked to have been in democratic America in 1850, especially if you're an African-American? Slavery. I mean, you just don't get to where we are overnight. You have to grow there. And we have to realize that we have to give other countries time to do that. We have to do it on their timeline, not on our timeline.

So, what you have to have in Iraq is an understanding that they are fundamentally different, and they don't see things like we do. They are wedded to the past. You have, right now, the legacy of Arab nationalism—Arab nationalism goes back decades. You have the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and religious law, and they shut down minority rights. You have decades of Kurdish repression. All that going on right now. You have to realize, that's the environment we're in. So, if you're going to have a democratic transformation over there, it has to adapt to the comfort zone of the Iraqis and the people that you're trying to impose that on. Number one, they embrace the past. Number two, you have to account for their ethnicity. Number three, you have to realize and account for their deep religious beliefs. Number four, you've got to look at what their tribal heritage is. Number five, you've got to do it on their timeline and not on ours.

The Iraqis have a legitimate right to shape their future. You know, we—the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority)—wrote a Constitution for them. We put together reconstruction projects and decided what needed to be built without much input from the Iraqis. That's wrong. What we need to do is allow them to have some control over what's going to happen in their country, and allow for their mistakes and failures. We have to allow them to fail. We just have to have enough oversight to make sure that they don't collapse. If you've read *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, T.E. Lawrence puts it best. I can't remember exactly how he put it, but he said it's better for them to do it imperfectly than for you to do it for them perfectly, because it's their country and your time here is limited. That rings true today of our involvement in Iraq.

The first thing I think you need to do over there is have what I call democratic regionalism or federalism. You have to have federal entities. You know, there is no such thing as Iraq. Iraq's a line drawn on maps around 1922 by the Brits and others. It takes a bunch of disparate people and puts a government in Baghdad that holds them together through fear and brutality for the next 85 years. They all know that. They're not stupid. They know they're not a third world country. And they're not going to sit back and allow control from Baghdad unless they are the majority.

That's the problem you have right now. If we have elections as outlined by Sistani, the UN, and the CPA, I predict to you that we will have a ruling Shia majority that could become fundamentalist and practice Islamic religious law. I'm going to tell you, the Kurds won't stand for that. They're not going to step back from 13 years of democracy. The Sunnis aren't going to stand for that either.

So, I think the only solution is, divide them into federal entities. You've already got one entity there called Kurdistan, the three northern provinces. The next one you could have is the Sunni Triangle. The third one is everything in the south that is Shia. Then there is the complex of Baghdad, because while nobody in Baghdad likes each other, they've learned how to coexist over the last 70 or 80 years. So, you could have an entity there. If you do that, you've backed everybody into a comfort zone in which they're ethnically alike, they're religiously alike, and they are tribally alike. You allow those federal entities to do their own taxation, to select their own language, select their own religion if they want to, to raise a police force, to design their own school system, design their own health system, etcetera. And over that, you put a very weak republican government, that has a UN representative, goes to OPEC, raises a small army to seal the borders, does some taxation, has basic standards for education, basic standards for medicine, those types of things. That's not a unique idea. You can go back and call that the Articles of Confederation that took 13 federal entities in America and put them together, because they sure weren't going to be ruled by anybody. So they started out with a weak federal government, and they slowly walked into democracy. I think that's what we have to do over there, and if we don't do that, I believe there is potential to have a civil war.

Let me tell you the ten things I think have to happen over there for us to be successful. The first one is, we have to adopt a foreign policy that negates Iranian influence in Shia Iraq. Let me tell you, that is important, because Iranians have been pouring through there since the war began. You know, the war in the 1980s between Iraq and Iran was Saddam Hussein shutting down the Iranians. We all talk about that war—it was a chemical war, a missile war, and all that—but he shut down the Iranians. They didn't get another chance until we went to war over there. Since that time, you've had thousands of Iranians flowing through as religious pilgrims. You can see many of them with Sadr down in Najaf. So, Iran's design is to bring fundamentalists and Islamic law into Iraq, and if we have an election in Iraq where majority rules without minority rights, we could get that.

We faced something like that before. What we need is a national strategy that says we're not going to allow that. You know, I love Harry Truman. I think he was a great president. In 1947, when things were very dim for us, even though we had just won World War II, he went to Congress with a very bold statement. Let me read that

statement to you. He said, "I believe that it must be a policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure. Free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation." Now, that became the Truman Doctrine. What it did was stabilize what was going on in Greece and Turkey and really kept Greece and Turkey from falling [to the communists]. What we need is a presidential doctrine that is hard core and says we're going to stop [Iranian, Syrian, and other attempts to influence events in Iraq]. Because if we allow that influence to spread we will endanger the Middle East, and we will have endangered ourselves.

The second thing we need to do is influence the development of the future government of Iraq, and the corresponding national elections, which will select that government, to prevent a nationwide Shia ruling majority. I just talked about that, and, like I said, my solution for that is federalism.

The third thing is, we need to absolutely guarantee the rights of minorities. If we have Shia and Islamic religious laws come in there, women will lose their rights, and so will others. Minority rights represent the core element of democracy. If we're going to have a democracy there, we have to protect minority rights. And we have to be strong in doing that. If we have a presidential doctrine, then minority rights needs to be one of the fundamental principles of that doctrine.

The fourth thing, we need to share the wealth of Iraq with the people of Iraq, and the wealth of Iraq is oil. You know, production is back to 2.5 million barrels a day. It's going to go higher because there are unlimited untapped resources in the north. The Kuwaiti Minister of Oil told me, "Iraq today is where Kuwait was 30 years ago. When we are finished with the exploration in the north of the oil fields, they will have a greater oil capacity than we have in Kuwait." I believe that. What's important is the issue of the future for Iraq. One of the main issues is what do they do with their petrodollars? I think those need to be shared with the federal entities, or shared directly with the people, somewhat like we do up in Alaska. If we do that, then what we've done is give the Iraqis a shared interest in their natural resources. It would alienate them completely when the pipelines are attacked, and it would demonstrate that the US harbors no claim toward Iraqi oil.

The fifth thing, we need to employ the unemployed youth. You know, half the population in the Arab world is under the age of 20, and that is certainly so in Iraq. That's the most receptive age to incitement. We have to take the youth off the streets and put them to work. I think we ought to review [President Franklin D.] Roosevelt's Depression era [programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps],

where he took the youth of America and put them on national projects. He paid them, and out of that, he not only employed them, but it helped restore the economy and provide a new infrastructure for the nation. And it wasn't hard to do.

Sixth, we need to rapidly stimulate the Iraqi economy. The CPA made a cardinal mistake by failing to promote Iraqi small business, Iraqi entrepreneurship, and failing to involve thousands of Iraqis in the reconstruction of their own country. We need to infuse money directly into Iraq. I'll tell you how I'd do it, you may not agree with this, most of the people I've talked to don't agree with this, but I'd give every family \$1,000. About 5,000 families, that's about \$5 billion bucks, that's not a lot of money the way we're spending it right now. But, I wouldn't make it a "freebie." I'd make them do something for it. Like, you'd have to turn in an operational weapon or something. That'd do a lot to get weapons off the street. But, that would infuse money. Then I would promote Iraqi small business. I would not allow a contract over there that didn't give at least half that contract to Iraqi businesses. I'd employ the youth.

Let me go back in history. In 1947, [Secretary of State George C.] Marshall went to the commencement exercise at Harvard and he made a statement. Let me read it to you. He said, "Our policy is directed not against any country or any doctrine, but it's directed against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose is the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist." That became the Marshall Plan. What we need is an Iraq Plan. We need a plan from the Administration that does exactly that. We need one that harnesses oil revenues, employs the youth, infuses significant amount of money directly to Iraqis, and eliminates the international debt against the Iraqis.

Seven, we need to provide electricity 24/7. Like I said, they don't have the capacity to do that. They never had electricity 24/7 under Saddam Hussein. But, what he did, he used electricity as a weapon to punish the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south. He cut off their electricity. He provided it 24/7 in Baghdad. We need to bring in these massive generating systems, countrywide, as we build new grids and give them electricity 24/7. If we do that, it would immediately be felt and would be well received by the Iraqi people, and it would be a significant indicator that quality of life is rising. And it's doable.

Eight, you need to remove—I call it decapitate—the head of the family of each terrorist organization involved in terrorism in Iraq. I want you to think about that for a minute. The way you defeat terrorism is exactly the same way that you fight organized crime. You mount a coordinated offensive. And it's crucial that the forces involved go to the top of the pyramid. What we have to do is go to the top of

the pyramid and eliminate that. You don't defeat drugs by picking up the dealer on the street. You go to the top of the pyramid and defeat him, take him out.

Nine, we need to increase international support to block financial aid for global terrorism. The engine that fuels terrorism is money, huge amounts of money. That money is channeled directly to terrorists by their direct supporters and supportive mosques. It comes through religious establishments. The money funds the terrorists' travel, their explosives, their hideouts, their infrastructure. It brainwashes each new generation coming up. Their prime money sources are Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority. Many of these are safe havens for terrorists. What we need to do is monitor all donations from the rest of the world into Islamic organizations, and we need to dry up the finances that go into terrorist organizations. That's hard but doable.

Finally, we need to develop a strategy right now for an independent, autonomous, and US-supported Kurdistan, that we would evolve should the Iraqi government fail. Now, what I'm saying is, if we have elections, and we don't do anything to shape those elections, and the situation goes into majority rule—and majority rule is the Shia, who are a little over 60 percent of the population—and the Shia, because of the strong Iranian influence, go into religious law, we need to extract Kurdistan from that. Kurdistan is a relatively democratic area, they have a good economy, they have superb minority rights—about 25-30 percent of their leaders in Kurdistan are women, Christians, and others. We cannot let that go down, if everything else goes down. If we do support Kurdistan, it would be the third democracy in the Middle East, along with Israel and Turkey. Now, there'd be problems with the Turks, but we can control that. The other thing is the Kurds could be a beacon in that part of the Middle East for what we would like to see.

The Kurds have long been supportive of the United States. They had the Peshmarga [Kurdish warriors] with Special Operations Forces during the last war. Think about it, if the rest of the country goes down, and we let the Kurds go with it, how do we justify letting the democracy go down with that? We can't do that. Think about the Philippines at the end of the Spanish American War. The Philippines gave us coaling and fueling stations for the Navy. It allowed us, for the next 50 years, to project ourselves in the Pacific so that we could maintain a Pacific presence. The Philippines became immensely important leading into World War II. It was our launch pad for a presence in the Pacific. The Kurdish region, the northern region, can be our launch pad for the next 50 years as a strategic strong-point for us where we have troops, airfields, and things like that. I think that's very important. If we allow that to slip away, that's a huge, huge strategic mistake.

Let me wind this up now, giving you some real quick lessons learned for the

future, because all you guys in here are going to be doing this for the rest of your careers. So, you need to start adopting some philosophy and your own personal doctrines for how you handle civilian-military affairs. The first one is, you have to have a positive relationship between the civilians and the military when you go into a war and a postwar situation. My view is that the civilian is always subordinate to the military—subordinate to the CINC (Commander in Chief; now called Combatant Commanders). (I know you can't say CINC anymore, but I can because I'm a retired guy.) But, the civilian guy ought to be subordinate to the CINC. I'll tell you why. He can't accomplish anything without the military helping him do that. It ought to be that way until the handoff is made to the State Department, then the civilian can be in charge. I think, in doing that, you place some things OPCON (operational control) to the civilian. You put the civil affairs units OPCON to him, because he needs those. You OPCON to him some of the engineering support—I'm talking about Corps of Engineers type support, not tactical engineers. And some Military Police organizations, because he needs security. Some aviation, because he needs to be able to move around.

The second thing you have to have is security. And we've talked about that. You have a PSD (Personal Security Detail) for the leadership, you have to have static security, and you have to have mobile security so you can move your people around. Some of that can be contracted, but not all of it. The civilian piece of this has to be involved early in the concept of operations. I would say, my equation is that Day One of war plans equals Day One of postwar plans.

You've got to have money. Without money you can't have contractors. You can't get anything accomplished without contractors. You also need "quick start" money that you can give out to brigade, battalion, and company commanders. I mean, every company commander ought to have \$10,000 in his pocket where he can do something. Every battalion commander ought to have \$25,000; every brigade commander ought to have \$50,000. That's not a lot of money, by the way. They can accomplish immense things with that money. The money ought to be rapidly available through a streamlined process.

You need a blue chip source selection group that can rapidly approve contracts. Get away from our current way of doing contracting. You need to jettison the current government contracting process in time of war. It just doesn't work.

The next thing you need to do is have clear national objectives with a national priority. We didn't start this war with that, and we don't have it now, I don't think. You need to have a well-defined, hand-picked team from the start. You need to train for postwar just like we train for war. I would add "postwar" to the NTC (National Training Center) and CMTC (Combat Maneuver Training Center) exercise and

rotations we do. I'd take a retired ambassador, a retired general, or a retired somebody, and make him the "Jerry Bremer" and have him put together a little team. At the end of a rotation, we'd spend six or eight days going into the postwar piece of that and see the major issues that fall out of that. You know, in the military, we don't take anything seriously unless we're graded on it. Until we start grading ourselves on that, we're really not going to be serious about it, and we're not going to do it very well.

You have to have the immediate involvement, immediate interaction, and immediate utilization of the indigenous population. You need daily meetings between the civilian and the military leaders. In fact, you need to have an integrated staff. I don't think we have that today over there.

You need a robust media effort—TV, radio, newspapers, HBO-type movies—focused on the population. Now, there's one thing in this nation we ought to be able to do better than anybody else in the world, and that's media. We've got Hollywood, we can do anything. But, even today, we haven't solved the problem of getting the word out to the Iraqi people. I'll tell you, you can fault me for the initial part of that because I didn't do a good job on that. I had a bad media organization. But we did a bad job on that; we still do a bad job on that. That's very important.

I think we need much broadened and well-defined role for the Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers can do marvelous things in a postwar effort. And we really haven't harnessed the talent and the energy of the Corps of Engineers the way we should. Right now, you got Carl Strock running the Corps, and we ought to task him to restructure the Corps of Engineers for the future.

The final thing is, civilian operations in postwar. They don't start with Phase IV. They roll with the operation. We ought to have civilian operations rolling with the operation and have them begin functioning as the territory is occupied. If we had done it right in Iraq, we would have rolled all the way up to Baghdad and laid out a carpet of civilian operations over everything we had uncovered.

All right, that's my long monologue with you. I'll be glad to answer any questions.

Garner Question and Answer Session

Question: Sir, in the conference we've touched on some touchy-feely stuff about cultural obstacles; the problems of changing another culture or communicating across it. It's my own sense that, whether you're talking about northern Iraq and the Kurds, or the Shiites, or whoever, a lieutenant or a sergeant employing first impressions, mutual respect, and development of common interests can overcome any, almost any, cultural obstacles around the world. But if there is a lack of developing common interests and emphasizing relationships, from the strategic to the tactical levels, then it is in that context that cultural obstacles become insurmountable. True or false?

Answer: Oh, I think it's more complex than that. First of all, I think I agree with what you alluded to. I think if you leave disciplined soldiers to represent you, they'll do it extremely well. You could see that in Iraq. I mean, kids surround the soldiers. They are fairly well respected. The problems we have in Iraq, those didn't start with soldiers. They started at the top. I think the soldiers did a superb job. I agree though, I think you have to have mutual understanding, you have to have respect. But there's another thing about the Middle East, too. You have to have force. If you don't use force when you should use force, they lose respect for you. Because force is something that they understand. They believe it. When we didn't finish what we were doing in Fallujah, when we went to the Iraqi brigade, we absolutely lost a monumental amount of respect, not only among the Iraqis, but in the whole Middle East. You know, it's a double-edged sword.

Question: Sir, being a former civil affairs Officer, I'm still a little bit puzzled. civil affairs—military government—was created during World War II to do, not just planning, but doing the quasi-civilian occupation job. Yet, over the years, civil affairs, even though it's grown in strength—some 3,000 members in the reserve component—has lost its way in terms of any kind of involvement with civil administration. It was driven out of training. It was driven out of practice, really, within the organization. And yet, you're implying that there ought to be an organization right behind the troops to perform that halfway function of emergency relief and to do the occupation type of role. I guess I'm puzzled about exactly what the role was in your organization, as well as in CFLCC and CENTCOM. Not just in the planning, but in the execution phase.

Answer: I didn't have anything to do with the planning for civil affairs. That was all done by the J5 and by CFLCC. And they planned well, by the way. But, I think civil affairs organizations are like the Corps of Engineers. They have an immense potential there to do things, and we're not using that potential now. We have to relook at how we're doing that. I think the civil affairs organization should work

for whoever is going to be the civilian administrator working for the CINC. As you uncover territory, I think the civil affairs guys go in there, and they shape the future environment. They put in town councils if they need to, they get schools restarted—they provide the initial input to do things until you can get the civilians pushed in there to take over. What happened to us in Iraq was that we uncovered a place but immediately the Shiite were in there, and they filled that vacuum pertaining to human needs—schools, medical, public works, that type of thing. We need the civil affairs guys to come in there and fill that need. They have the talent to do it. They have the training to do it. They have the organization to do it. We just don't let them do it.

Question: I continually saw in the newspapers where a young lieutenant or a young captain was doing an outstanding job as the “mayor” of a city, which is great, but I was always asking, “Shouldn't that be a civil affairs type role?” And yet we're throwing combat arms soldiers into it.

Answer: Well, the reason they do that, I think, is because the civil affairs guys are centralized in a civil affairs organization, and whoever is running that organization defines the dynamics of that civil affairs organization. So, if you're commanding 3-325 IN, and you're in a city, and you've got to do something, you tell an Alpha Company commander, “You go down there, and you start doing that stuff.” You don't own that civil affairs guy. So, what we need to do is either have him OPCON to him, or have a direct support relationship. I mean, we know how to do these things. We've been doing them for hundreds of years.

Question: Sir, you have a very in-depth understanding of the Middle East and the people there. You understand that it's very important to have person-to-person relationships and build trust and camaraderie and friendship with the leadership, as you've done with many in the Kurdish areas. When we send people from the United States Army to Iraq and other places, one builds a relationship whether he's in psychological operations or covert operations, what have you. But then, two years later, a new guy goes in. How do we change the way we approach this thing in a culture that's so different from ours so that we can build institutional relationships based on human relationships. The British Colonial Empire did it very well. My father used to tell me that the British agents that would come to Baluchistan would read Persian poetry and would sit down and recite it phrase by phrase. They would sit down and drink chai with the locals and establish camaraderie. And they'd be the same agents that would come over and over again. It seems like we can learn something from the Europeans and what they have done in the past in their empires. I don't like to use the word “empire” for us—we're not imperialists, we're not colonialists. But we have worldwide interests, and in order to protect our worldwide interests, we need to look at the world from a different perspective and

approach this thing from a different model. Perhaps a historical model, perhaps a new one. Your comments, sir.

Answer: A couple. We do a horrible job of what you're professing. We've known for a long time now that we're going to be intimately involved in the Middle East for a long period. We haven't done anything to prepare the Armed Forces socially, politically, or culturally to do that. You know, the strength of the Army in World War II—going from an extremely small Army to a mega-million man Army, was in the institutions. During the interwar years, we put all our emphasis in the institutions to build the tactical and the doctrinal mindset of the military person. We haven't done that now. The services are so small that they don't have the ability to spend time in the institutions. The budget has been so small that we rob from the institutions to keep the operational Army going. Those were hard decisions, and they were terrible decisions, but they were the only decisions that could be made. Having said all that, number one, the military is too damn small. It needs to be larger. You need at least two more divisions in the Army. You need a lot more MPs in the Army, and you need, I think, another Marine Expeditionary Force in the Marine Corps. As you build size, you are able now to start putting fringe benefits on that size. You can now take more people and get them culturally engaged in things. You also have to put an importance on that.

The importance right now in the Army is to do tactical things. I mean, when was the last time an FAO made a second star [major general]? It's been a long time. The other thing we can do is take a page out of the Marine Corp's book, where they go and recruit people who were born in other countries, so when the marines go into a country, they have two or three people in the Marine Expeditionary Unit, or four or five people that are there and speak the language. They grew up there, they have the culture, but they're Marines. That helps. We don't do that in the Army, and we should. We have the ability in this nation to do that.

Question: Sir, with respect to Kurdistan. Assume that there is a high degree of autonomy, or even independence. What's your assessment of the prospect of being able to get the Turks to go along with them?

Answer: I think it'll be a problem. Let me tell you what's happening right now. I'm not in here trying to sell you an independent Kurdistan. In fact, if I brought Talibani and Brizani in here, they'd tell you, "We don't want that if you can make the Iraqi system work. We don't want that. But, what we're not going to do, we're not going to walk away from 13 years of freedom." I support that. But since the last year they have had big operations going on in the exploration and drilling of oil in the north. All that's done by Turkish companies. They are rebuilding their airfields. All that's done by Turkish companies. So, what they're doing, they're pulling the Turks in there economically; they're spending a lot of time with the Turks. And

they have become far closer to the Turkomans. So, given a little bit longer, I think the Turks and the Kurds themselves will work out some of those problems, but not all of those problems. It would take a strong position by us to get past the Turkish thing. All I'm saying is that if all of Iraq goes south, don't jettison the Kurdish part of that with it, because they're on our side and they always will be. And it's a democracy. You can't let that go.

Question: This may be a bit parochial, but we talked a lot about interagency operations. Any comments or observations on interservice issues that may have come up in Phase IV or with your...

Answer: I was never there during Phase IV. I don't even think we're in Phase IV now, are we? Once I got in Kuwait, I went up to CFLCC headquarters every day. Bates and I went up there every day and watched what was going on. We sat there with McKiernan and "Fuzzy" Webster and those guys. I thought they worked tremendously well together. It's what always happens. The problems between the Air Force and the Army, and the problems between the Army and the Marine Corps, and the problems between the Marine Corps and the Air Force, and the Marine Corps and the Navy, and all that, are all Beltway problems. They don't generally occur that much in theater. The guys work out arrangements in theater. So, I never saw a big problem.

Question: I was intrigued by your idea of the confederation structure for Iraq. But I wanted to know, how hard would it be, or how desirable would it be, to divide up the national ministries in order to support each of the federal states?

Answer: I don't think you would. I think you keep the national ministries in the republic, and they begin to provide that ministerial support, but on a far more weakened basis than they do right now.

Question: But, if they're going to set up, for example, educational systems within each of the...

Answer: Then I think you have the republic Ministry of Education lay out minimum standards of education, and they make sure that those standards are followed inside each one of the federations. The Minister for Health would lay out minimum health standards, minimum requirements for the amount of money that federations would put into the health system, and all that, and they would make sure that it happens. But minimum stuff. But, initially, the internal control of Iraq would be in the hands of the federations. And the external control of Iraq would be in the hands of the republic.

Question: Would it be at all practical to take the edge off the ethnic aspect by having each of the provinces be independent—I mean, have a confederation of the

18 provinces rather than a confederation of ethnic enclaves?

Answer: I think that's another solution, John. I really do. I think that you could have 17 provinces and Baghdad. But I think that, if you carved out four or five entities, those entities that I talked of are pretty homogenous. And what you would do, after you elect the delegates in this election, then you would have them set up what the entities are going to be. And say it comes out to be four or five, then in the next set of elections, the people in the 17 provinces and Baghdad vote on which one of those entities they want to be in. For instance, you may have the people around Mosul vote to be in the Kurdish entity. So, you give the people a chance to say, "Here's the one I want to live with." And if you do that, you begin to get rid of the warfare that's going on, because down there in Fallujah, for example, they're not going to fight each other. They're all Sunnis. They're all members of tribes. And they all practice this religion, and they're all interrelated somehow, and so they're going to knock off this fighting because they're in charge of their own destiny. The problem right now is they want to get us out of there. Also, [unless you arrange to put them in charge of their own destiny, they may say,] "Let's have a civil war because if we don't do that, we're going to be ruled by the tyranny of the majority—the Shia."

Question: Sir, have you been consulted by the US administration since leaving Iraq?

Answer: Let me see. From George Bush, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, no. From Rumsfeld, yes. Rumsfeld got Larry DeRita to call me, and Larry said, "Hey, Rumsfeld's going over to see [Paul] Bremer. Write down a bunch of things that Rumsfeld has to focus on while he's there. And some things he ought to ask, and things they ought to be doing right now." So, I made up a list, and I took it over there. And Rumsfeld sent me a note that said, "Hey, thanks, this is good stuff." Then Rumsfeld got over to Iraq and met with Bremer, and he says, "Oh, by the way, here's a list of things Jay Garner thinks you ought to be doing." So, what little relationship Bremer and I had just got tubed with that. But, I wrote him a plan for more rapidly bringing the Army back in, for more rapidly conducting elections—a lot of those type of things.

Question: Sir, based on your experience, both in the military and now as a retired general officer, what would you tell young majors and lieutenant colonels that are about to go over there at the battalion and brigade level? What's the one piece ... the one golden nugget you need to keep in your head as you start looking at conducting operations in that culturally different environment and trying to make sure everything they do is to the betterment of the mission or caring for their soldiers.

Answer: You mean, if my son was a company commander in the 503d, what

would I tell him?

Question: Yes, sir.

Answer: I'd tell him there are things that don't change anywhere. Number one, you have to take care of your troops. You have to be very cognizant at all times of what they're thinking about, what's motivating them, and what's not motivating them, and where they are. Number two, you've got to go find out things for yourself. To hell with staffs and all that. They're good, but that's data. You go find things out for yourself. There's a great picture of Jim Gavin when he was commander of the 82d Airborne Division, and it's right around the time of Operation Market Garden [in World War II]. It's a picture of Jim Gavin walking by himself carrying an M-1, and he's going to find out what the hell's happening. I think that's a tremendous lesson. If you're a leader, you need to find out what's going on. Don't let people tell you what's going on—you take that as data. And the final thing is, you've got to be sensitive to casualties. You may have to be forceful, but be forceful in a way that minimizes casualties. The American public's not sensitive to casualties. Everybody thinks they are, but they're not. But in the military, we are. I mean, you just don't want to lose soldiers. But you've got to do what you've got to do. But you do it in the most intelligent way and the swiftest way and the most forceful way so that you minimize casualties.